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Minds, Materialism and Mental Representation 
Can naturalistic accounts of mental representation explain intentionality without circularity? 
____________________________________________________________ 
Summary 
This essay argues that naturalism about mental representations is a failure: the matrix of explanatory 
requirements, ontological commitments and intuitions in naturalist accounts fails to result in a self-consistent 
notion of representation. Mental representations are posited to explain an intentional agent’s behaviour and 
this explanatory role depends crucially on what the representation is about. Therefore it is necessary that 
representations have determinate content in virtue of which they cause behaviour. Naturalist accounts try to 
combine these explanatory requirements with a physicalist ontology in which intentional properties must be 
reduced to, or be supervenient on, the physical. Moreover, it is often demanded that two intuitions are 
respected: that representations are interpreted, and that there is a strong dividing line between mental and 
non-mental which should be recoverable from an account of mental representation. I argue that no consistent 
notion of representation can balance all these demands. The most labile commitments are the pre-theoretical 
intuitions, so I suggest either we radically alter these in light of theoretical results to persevere with a 
physicalist ontology, or we keep them and accept that physicalism cannot do them justice. Finally, I present a 
reason for choosing the latter position. I argue that the leading naturalist accounts still fail to yield 
determinate content in virtue of which representations are used to cause behaviour (i.e., they fail William 
Ramsey’s job description challenge (JDC)). I suggest one plausible solution to this (‘Representation as’), but 
which would be unacceptable to a naturalist. If there are no other options for naturalist accounts to secure the 
required determinate content other than ‘Representation as’ it follows that no naturalist account can pass the 
JDC. I suggest this results from the naturalist starting point that representations are subpersonal entities: only 
entities at the personal level are equipped to pass the JDC as Ramsey lays it out. Therefore, true 
representations are only at the personal level. Subpersonal posits in explanations of cognition may have 
explanatory value, but there is little relevant similarity between them and non-mental representations so as to 
validate thinking of them as representational as such. 
 Chapter 1 spells out a framework in which mental representations are posits in theories of cognition 
specified completely by their parent theories’ structure and ontological commitments, the desiderata they 
seek to meet, and a set of pre-theoretical commitments about the nature of mind and representation. Chapter 
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2 outlines how naturalism and physicalism are related in the ontological commitments of naturalist theories 
of mental representation, and also introduces explaining intentionality as an important desideratum. Chapter 
3 draws out two prominent pre-theoretical intuitions on mental representations, and examines how and why 
two leading philosophical theories of mental representation fail to yield determinate content or pass the JDC. 
Chapter 4 diagnoses a problem common to naturalistic theories and advocates a solution which is 
incompatible with naturalism, concluding that the explanatory goals of mental representations are ultimately 
unachievable in a naturalistic framework. 
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Chapter 1 
1.1 Introduction 
It is a fact of our mental lives that we think thoughts about particular things. My thought that it is a sunny 
day is about the condition of the weather today. Another commonplace observation is that what our thoughts 
are about guides our behaviour. A cliched example is that my belief that there is beer in the fridge, in 
conjunction with my desire to drink a beer, can be used to explain my going to the fridge to get a beer. 
Elementary reasoning like this — ‘folk psychology’ — is ubiquitous in everyday explanations of behaviour. 
Beliefs and desires, when talked about like this, are propositional attitudes. The proposition ‘there is a beer in 
the fridge’ is the ‘content’ of the propositional attitude of belief.  
 For folk psychological reasoning to work those propositions must be determinate. A belief-desire 
explanation would be unsatisfactory if the disjunction ‘there is beer in the fridge or Paris is in France’ were 
the content of my belief. The point is that to satisfactorily explain behaviour the content of propositional 
attitudes must be relevant to the behaviour explained, and also determinate, i.e. not indeterminate between 
different, non-disjunctive propositions. Folk psychological explanation, and indeed our experience, suggests 
we operate with thought contents (the term ‘thought’ here covers beliefs, desires etc.) that are determinate 
and recognisably so. Some have dubbed such explanations ‘cognitivist’ (Haugeland, 1978: 215),  and I will 1
follow this for expediency. So a basic principle I will hold is: cognitivist explanations require that what a 
relevant thought is about plays a causal-explanatory role in explaining behaviour (Braddon-Mitchell and 
Jackson, 2007: 188). 
 A third preliminary observation about thoughts is that they can, and frequently do, concern objects 
and states of affairs which are absent or nonexistent. Our thoughts can be about, or directed upon, things not 
being currently perceived (electrons, Abraham Lincoln) and also those which we could never hope to 
perceive (unicorns). Yet thoughts are reliably about such things, and not others, in ways that figure 
prominently in cognitivist explanations of our actions. How? One popular view is that the mind is a 
representational device. When we have thoughts our minds have representations which bear some relevant 
relation to the actual things the thoughts are about.  A propositional attitude’s content is a representation on 2
this view. Thoughts are about things because the mind can represent those things. I will call all thoughts and 
 According to Haugeland, cognitivism is “the position that intelligent behaviour can (only) be explained by appeal to internal 1
‘cognitive processes’, that is, rational thought in general”.
 Relations only obtain between existing objects or properties so ‘representation’ cannot strictly be a relation as we frequently 2
represent things which do not exist. I will not go further into this issue. Sceptics can view my use of ‘relation’ as a placeholder term 
for whatever sort of thing it turns out to be, if no understanding of relation strictly fits.
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propositional attitudes ‘mental states’. The representational view of mind then supposes that some mental 
states are, or involve, representations. 
 Representational mental states thus have contents which represent what the states are about. 
Determining how mental states get their contents is the job of a theory of mental content. This leads us to a 
simple schematic of how mind, world and thought relate. Let 𝕽(p) be a mental representation with the 
content p. A content is generally presumed to be a proposition. The representation is about some object or 
state of affairs, and from this derives its particular content. Though my thought ‘The Netherlands is a good 
place to live’ is about the Netherlands, the content is more specific than simply ‘The Netherlands’. For now it 
suffices to note that for 𝕽(p) to represent some object or state of affairs, 𝕽(p) must stand in a certain relation 
to the object or state of affairs which the mental state is about.  Elucidating the nature of this relation is a 3
central problem in philosophy of mind.  
 So the picture is this: when some thinking subject, Q, thinks about something they token a mental 
representation 𝕽(p) of that thing. 𝕽(p) is about some object or state of affairs, 𝓞, though 𝓞 need not exist. I 
will call 𝓞 the ‘represented object’ or ‘represented’. The content, p, is related to, and derives from, 𝓞. In 
Chapter 2 I will explain this relationship further. A representation stands in for the represented object in Q’s 
thoughts. Filling out the details of this simple picture will be my task here. The nature of the representing 
relation — what it means for a mental state to represent something — is still a puzzle. I aim to formulate a 
definition of mental representation and assess whether or not naturalistic approaches to the mind can 
accommodate it. To do so requires a clear starting point on how to conceive of representation and its role in 
cognition. I will follow the dominant view that “representing is a functional status or role of a certain sort, 
and to be a representation is to have that status or role” (Haugeland, quoted in Ramsey, 2007: 23). In this 
chapter I will lay the groundwork for specifying what this role is. This requires stripping the term 
‘representation’ of much theoretical baggage and outlining a framework within which to specify how its role 
is defined. 
1.2 Towards a Theory-Neutral Conception of  Representation 
The concept of mental representation has accrued a lot of theoretical baggage by featuring in diverse theories 
of mind which invoke representations. For example, Jerry Fodor’s language of thought (LOT) hypothesis 
 There are disagreements over whether representations represent objects like ‘that cat’, properties like ‘being red’, or whole states of 3
affairs like ‘the red apple on the picnic bench’. My formulation is intended to be neutral on this issue, and I will not take a stand on it 
here.
 4
Michael Hegarty
(1975), and the computational view of mind in which LOT features, have fostered strong associations 
between mental representations, folk psychology, and the semantic and syntactic requirements of symbols in 
computational views of mind.  
 Yet influential work starting with Stephen Stich (1992), and continuing with William Ramsey 
(2007), challenges the essentiality of these associations. Peter Godfrey-Smith (2006: 43), for example, argues 
you needn’t be a realist about propositional attitudes to have a notion of mental representation. He attempts 
to abstract the notion of ‘mental representation’ from the different theoretical and quasi-theoretical contexts 
in which it is enmeshed. I will use his work to form as theory-neutral a view about mental representations as 
possible. 
 Separating the concept of mental representation from folk psychology is perhaps most important for 
attaining this theory-neutral perspective. The naturalistic philosophical work on mental representations which 
I will be discussing is largely aligned with contemporary cognitive science. Cognitive science is concerned 
with explanations of cognition on the level of brain processes, thereby introducing a reason why folk 
psychological talk and mental representation should be separated. 
 Daniel Dennett observed that explanations of cognition and behaviour proceed along parallel lines he 
distinguished as the ‘personal’ and ‘subpersonal’ levels of explanation. He describes the personal as “the 
explanatory level of people and their sensations and activities” and the subpersonal level of explanation as 
“of brains and events in the nervous system” (1969: 93). Personal-level explanations reference things like 
intention, belief and desire — just like folk psychology. But cognitive science looks for subpersonal-level 
explanations by giving a causal-physical analysis in terms of neurological or computational mechanisms 
(Ramsey, 2016: 4). There is no place, according to Dennett, for personal-level phenomena like believing or 
seeing in explanations aimed at the subpersonal level, and vice versa. Dennett wants to prevent the 
“contamination of the physical story with unanalysable qualities or ‘emergent phenomena’” (1969: 96). In 
his view a personal-level term like ‘pain’ does not refer to anything — to talk about pain in terms of neural 
processes is to describe a different phenomenon. A physical explanation of minds will thus not include 
personal terms at risk of committing a category error. 
 I think it is important to bear the distinction in mind as it imposes some order in the discussion of 
naturalistic theories of mental content, which often seek to explain personal-level phenomena in terms of 
subpersonal processes. I will follow Ramsey and other contemporary naturalistic philosophers of mind in 
separating folk psychology from mental representation. To engage with the naturalistic discussion I will for 
no align myself with their starting point that mental representations are subpersonal entities. I will also 
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follow Ramsey and Stich in holding that representations should be treated as posits within theories of mind 
with the goal of explaining cognition. This means that the nature of a mental representation is constrained in 
part by the particular commitments of the theory of cognition in which it is embedded.  
 My goal is to give an account of the representing relation. In the next section I summarise an 
important consideration raised by Ramsey in this regard. 
1.3 Ramsey’s Job Description Challenge 
I mentioned above that mental representation is a functional role, and said that one of my core principles is 
that a representation’s content must play a causal-explanatory role. One of Ramsey’s important contributions 
to the debate is to pull these two aspects apart. He argues — I think convincingly — that a full theory of 
mental representation should have two parts: an account of how mental representations get their content, and 
a description of a representation’s functional role (Ramsey, 2007: xv). Ramsey claims there has been too 
much focus on theories of content at the expense of getting clear on the functional role (2007: xii; 29). The 
main message of his book Representation Reconsidered is that, where mental representations are invoked in 
theories of cognition, the theory must be justified in claiming the posits labelled ‘mental representation’ are 
actually playing representational roles. He argues that many contemporary theories of cognition invoke 
mental representations which, on closer inspection, fail to actually play representational roles. For clarity, I 
will call such posits ‘pseudo-representations’. 
 Clearly, judging if a posit plays a representational role requires an account of what it means for 
something to function as a representation. Ramseys’ project is to specify this functional role, or in other 
words to give a ‘job description’ of a posit for it to qualify as a representation. For this reason he terms the 
challenge he lays down to theories of cognition the ‘job description challenge’ (JDC). Ramsey explains the 
JDC: “There needs to be some unique role or set of causal relations that warrants our saying some structure 
or state serves a representational function… I’ll refer to the task of specifying such a role as the ‘job 
description challenge.’” (2007: 27) Any posit which is called a representation in the language of the theory, 
but fails the JDC, is merely a pseudo-representation. 
 As a result of the causal-explanatory role representations are supposed to play in cognitivist 
explanations, it is clear that part of the motivation for positing representations is because of their explanatory 
value. The breakdown of cognition into, for example, computational states and representational tokens —as 
in the computational theory of mind — is only motivated because it serves an explanatory goal. If the theory 
posits entities which add no explanatory value then — aside from considerations like coherence with other 
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theories — there is no reason to keep those entities in the theory. Explanatory relevance is one of Ramsey’s 
central motivations (2007: 28). The idea can be expressed like this:  
Explanatory Purchase: if we remove mention of ‘representation’ in a theory of cognition and the 
theory’s explanatory power is undiminished, then the notion of representation in the account in 
question fails to be truly representational.  
A posit’s functioning as a representation has to be essential to the explanatory ambit of the theory in which 
that posit is embedded. If not then it is a pseudo-representation. Ramsey’s aim in putting forward the JDC is 
to bring out the functional role of a representation in a theory by examining how it achieves Explanatory 
Purchase on cognition. 
 What does this functional role consist in? Ramsey invokes a ‘use’ condition: representations should 
represent a state of affairs and thereby allow an agent to use the representation to cognise or behave in 
relation to that state of affairs. The representation must be used as a representation for the state to function as 
a representation. As we have seen, representations have particular contents. It is in virtue of having a 
particular content that a representation represents what it does.  
 But having a particular content and being used by a system in a certain way to cause behaviour are 
logically separable. John Searle first made the point in his Chinese Room thought experiment (Searle, 1980): 
Chinese Room: an English-speaking man who knows no Chinese is locked in a room with a set of 
Chinese symbols and a rule book. The book pairs sets of Chinese symbols with each other. When 
certain Chinese symbols are passed into the room — in the form of questions from Chinese-speaking 
external observers — he uses the book to select and pass the corresponding paired symbols out 
again. It seems to the Chinese speakers that the questions are being answered correctly by a fluent 
Chinese speaker. 
Searle’s originally argued against strong varieties of artificial intelligence which suggested that running the 
right computer program was sufficient for something to have a mind. He exploits the intuition that since the 
man (playing the role of a CPU) understands no Chinese a computer program does not either. Mere formal 
manipulation of the symbols can never convey understanding of Chinese to the man. The idea is that 
 7
Michael Hegarty
successful syntactic manipulation is insufficient to recover semantic interpretation of the symbols 
manipulated.  
 Ramsey notes that Searle’s argument also counts against a representational interpretation of the 
symbols operated on in the computational theory of mind (2007: 48-49). Chinese Room presents a case of 
someone behaving exactly as if they do in fact understand the meaning of the Chinese symbols, though they 
do not. Nevertheless the symbols do have meaning independently because a Chinese speaker can understand 
them. So Chinese Room shows a case where a symbol is used in a role that seems representational, has the 
appropriate content, and causes behaviour in the representation user commensurate with their recognising 
that content. The content of a Chinese symbol would be correct for the causal-explanatory role of the 
representation to be played in line with a cognitivist explanation, though it seems clear that the symbol is not 
used as a representation in virtue of that content. That is, the symbol has not played a representational role, 
though all other conditions for it being a representation are apparently met. 
 This means that “to be a representation, a state or structure must not only have content, but it must 
also be the case that this content is in some way pertinent to how it is used” (Ramsey, 2007: 27) .Conjoining 
this insight with Explanatory Purchase we can say that a state only qualifies as a representation if it 
possesses a content that is explanatorily relevant and the system uses the representation in virtue of that 
content. Ramsey writes: “real mental representations — things like our thoughts and ideas — intuitively 
interact with one another and produce behaviour by virtue of what they are about” (2007: 48). 
 So we see that both 𝕽(p) having the particular content p, and 𝕽(p) being used as a representation by 
the system are necessary conditions for 𝕽(p) being a representation. However, they are jointly insufficient. 
What must be the case for 𝕽(p) to pass the JDC is that 𝕽(p) must be used by Q in virtue of having the 
content p. I propose JDC Pass — which is a specific way of cashing out Explanatory Purchase — to 
establish what conditions must be met for passing the JDC: 
JDC Pass: a theory of cognition, C, which posits a representation, 𝕽(p), with content p passes the 
JDC if and only if (i) a representation user, Q, within the architecture of C uses 𝕽(p) as a 
representation in virtue of the content p; and (ii) p is determinate and explanatorily relevant. 
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The functional role of representing is still unexplained. All JDC Pass specifies is that any representational 
theory has to have Explanatory Purchase. 
 To summarise, I have set out Ramsey’s job description challenge (JDC). Some apparently 
representational posit in a theory of cognition must pass the JDC (by fulfilling the conditions in JDC Pass) to 
qualify as a representation, according to Ramsey. If it fails, it is a mere pseudo-representation and does not 
play a recognisably representational role in the theory: the posit’s being thought of as a representation is 
irrelevant to the theory’s explanatory ambit. 
1.4 Three Kinds of  Constraint on a Theory of  Mental Representation 
I am following Ramsey in his conception of a representation as a theoretical posit, the utility of which is 
measured by the explanatory power it brings to the phenomena the theory aims to explain (Ramsey, 2007: 5). 
Thus, in trying to specify the functional role of a representation we must look at the theory in which it is 
embedded. As I see it, the commitments of that theory form one of three kinds of constraint on the functional 
role of a mental representation when viewed as a theoretical posit in this way. These three kinds are: the 
internal structure and background commitments of a theory of cognition, the desiderata the theory seeks to 
meet, and the pre-theoretical intuitions behind the theory. 
 Each theory has particular commitments and background assumptions which will affect the nature of 
the representational posit. For example, many theories — especially the naturalistic ones I consider here — 
are set within a physicalist ontology. Also, the internal structure of the theory affects how we interpret the 
nature of the representational posit. A computational theory of mind takes a representation to be a symbol 
token with particular semantic content which adheres to certain syntactical rules. In connectionism, 
representations are distributed and constructed from nodes with different weights of activation (Garson, 
2016). I will say that these commitments around internal structure and background assumptions (including 
ontology) specify the ‘form’ of the theory. The theory’s form is then one constraint on the nature of the 
representation posited in that theory. 
 The second constraint is what the theory aims to explain, or its desiderata. Mental representations are 
posits in theories of cognition: theories that explain our mental capacities. Therefore, a theory of cognition 
should explain those mental capacities. Its success at meeting those desiderata in turn is a measure of its 
success as a theory. For example, Fodor’s LOT is successful because it succeeds in explaining the 
compositionality, productivity and systematicity of thought. 
 Theory form and desiderata are both constraints on mental representations internal to particular 
theories of cognition. The third constraint which I have identified is crucial, and also the only extra-
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theoretical constraint: our pre-theoretical intuitions about what representing is. One example of how pre-
theoretical intuitions encroach on the notion of mental representation is the prevalence of folk psychology in 
the discussion. For example, LOT aims to explain belief and desire talk in computational terms, thereby 
taking our pre-theoretical view that there are beliefs and desires that serve in cognitivist explanations and 
building it into the theory from the outset. The pre-theoretical constraint is brought out by Ramsey’s JDC: we 
can only judge a posit to be a representation if we already have some idea of what representations are. The 
preponderance of metaphor and analogy around mental representations — viewing them as like maps or 
pictures — further supports this view. Thus our pre-theoretical intuition is a constraint that must be met by a 
representation-invoking theory because otherwise there is no justification for talking about minds as 
representational. It is only by analogy and metaphor with non-mental representations that we have any 
purchase on what a mind being representational means. This therefore entails that if we think of minds as 
representational we are already helping ourselves to some kind of preexisting, non-mental notion of 
representation. 
 If we view mental representations as posits in theories of cognition, then the form of the theory, the 
theory’s desiderata, and the pre-theoretical intuitions adhered to jointly specify the properties and functional 
role of the mental representation. For the rest of the chapter I will spell this out in more detail and try to 
derive a basic, theory-neutral notion of representation with which to work for the rest of the essay. This will 
rely on conceiving of mental representations as mental models used in reasoning. 
1.5 Mental Models and Mental Representations 
The idea of a mental representation is, at its most basic, that of an internal state related to some object or 
state of affairs which it represents. From this starting point I will try to derive a general notion of 
representation which, suitably augmented, could fit into the major theories like computationalism, 
connectionism etc.  
 Following Godfrey-Smith, I take the ‘mental model’ conception to embody the most pure notion of 
mental representation at the heart of these theories. This way of thinking about representations traces its roots 
to Kenneth Craik (1943), and has been popularised in contemporary thought in works by Godfrey-Smith 
(2006), Chris Swoyer (1991), Ramsey (2007), and Philip Johnson-Laird (1989). The idea is essentially that 
representations are ‘stand-ins’ or ‘surrogates’ for those objects or states of affairs which they represent. An 
agent can utilise those surrogates in planning and executing actions in virtue of the relevant similarity the 
model bears to the domain which the agent is considering. 
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 ‘Standing in for’ is implicit or explicit in many philosophical discussions of mental representation. 
Ruth Millikan follows it in her theory of mental content (Millikan, 2009: 397-398). Moreover, according to 
Andy Clark, activities like dreaming of Paris or planning a future holiday “require the brain to use internal 
stand-ins for potentially absent, abstract, or non-existent states of affairs” (Clark, 2001: 29). Thus we see 
how the mental model conception can help explain our ability to reason about objects even in their absence, 
as was mentioned in §I.i. 
 Craik’s original idea uses the observation that workers like engineers use models to test out features 
of a future construction. A civil engineer may construct a scale model of a bridge to test its performance 
under various conditions. This is a form of reasoning in the absence of what is being reasoned about (a 
currently non-existent, hypothetical bridge) to test out theories and solve problems. Craik’s insight is that 
mental representations allow minds to do similar tasks. So on this view a mental representation is an internal 
model (‘stand-in’, or ‘surrogate’) of whatever is being reasoned about (1943: 61). Godfrey-Smith puts it 
well: “a representation is one thing that is taken to stand for another, in a way relevant to the control of 
behavior or some other decision… when a person decides to control their behavior towards one domain, Y, 
by attending to the state of something else, X. The state of X is ‘consulted’ in working out how to behave in 
relation to Y.” (2006: 45)  
 Craik’s original presentation built in a resemblance between model and state of affairs. However, the 
core idea of a mental model remains in place without having to account for the relevant similarity of model 
and modelled through resemblance, or isomorphism. Those constitute just two of the options for how a 
mental representation ‘stands in for’ its represented object. For clarity, I will use the colourless term ‘stand in 
for’ rather than, say, ’represent’ or ‘mean’. My intention is that ‘standing in for’ is an idea prior to any of 
these other terms; it could be explicated in terms of resemblance, for example. But any such claim must be 
argued for. 
 I follow Godfrey-Smith and Ramsey in holding that the mental model conception captures the sense 
of representation while standing prior to developed theories. According to Ramsey: “Computational 
explanation often appeals to mental models or simulations to account for how we perform various cognitive 
tasks. Computational symbols serve as elements of such models, and, as such, must stand in for (i.e., 
represent) elements or aspects of that which is being modeled.” (2007: xiv) Godfrey-Smith gives the 
example of a person using a map: they consult the map as a guide to a particular target domain which the 
map models. He calls this the ‘basic representational model’ and notes how the starting point is with the 
“basic, everyday sense” of ‘representation’. 
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 In the next section I will synthesise what has been learned about mental representations through the 
JDC, the mental models conception, and the three families of constraint to derive a relatively theory-neutral 
notion of mental representation. 
1.6 A Schematic Theory of  Representation 
So far I have laid out my support for a particular view of mental representations which treats them as posits 
in theories of cognition. I have followed Godfrey-Smith and others in taking the mental model conception to 
be the foundational notion common to all representational theories. Through plugging this notion into any 
theory of cognition, and examining how the theory’s form and desiderata constrain the role the representation 
plays I contend we can specify the representational role for any given theory. My ultimate goal is to use this 
way of thinking to construct a solid foundation for thinking about mental representations, and then build on 
the conception of mental representation that falls out of this approach to assess whether or not intentionality 
can be explained naturalistically. 
 In general, then, what a mental representation is like (what properties it has, the nature of its 
functional role) is determined by the role it plays in the theory — its explanatory role. At root, the 
explanatory role is always that the representation is a ‘stand in’ for an object or state of affairs cognised. 
However, this is further augmented by the nature of the specific theory. Thus, the following questions arise, 
given any particular theory of cognition: 
(A): What is the form of the theory? 
(B): What explanatory role do mental representations play in that theory? 
(C): What does a mental representation need to be like to play that explanatory role? 
The answers are interdependent. The answer to (B) will be determined by (A): what the assumptions, 
commitments and structure of the theory in question are, and the desiderata it aims to meet. Furthermore, the 
answer to (C) is entirely dependent on specifying the explanatory role the representation plays in the theory. 
In the remainder of this chapter I will seek to use this way of thinking to derive a basic notion of mental 
representation, building on the ‘mental model’ conception. A first attempt at this might be: 
(MR): 𝕽(p) =Def an internal state, 𝓢, that stands in for some object or state of affairs, 𝓞, by having a 
content p. 
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Mental representations are, by definition, internal to agents. (MR) includes this internality requirement and 
captures the basic insight of the mental model view that representations ‘stand in for’ their represented 
objects. ‘Standing in for’, when suitably explicated, really amounts to the representation’s functional role.  
 (MR) can be further refined. 𝕽(p) has p as its content. Following Ramsey’s bifurcation of a theory of 
representation into a theory of content plus an account of functional role I take it that, given a suitable theory 
of content, p could be derived appropriately from 𝓞.  Nevertheless, Chinese Room shows it is logically 4
possible for a state with a determinate content to cause behaviour in a way that would make a 
representational explanation appropriate, yet for the theory to still lack Explanatory Purchase. In other 
words, it seems to be a representation and functions indistinguishably from a representation, but fails to be 
used as a representation by the system. These considerations highlight two shortcomings of (MR). Firstly, 
part of the role of 𝕽(p) is to be capable of causing behaviour. Secondly, 𝕽(p) must do so in virtue of being 
about, or standing in for, 𝓞. So a modified version of (MR): 
(MR2): 𝕽(p) =Def  an internal state, 𝓢, of Q that stands in for some object or state of affairs, 𝓞, (by 
having a content, p) such that 𝓢 is capable of causing behaviour of Q in virtue of standing in for 𝓞. 
I have postponed detailed discussion of technical terms like ‘content’ for the moment because a proper 
understanding requires a fuller conception of the aboutness of minds. I will introduce this discussion in the 
next chapter, and further develop (MR2) by introducing intentionality as the desideratum constraint. 
 For example, it could be the function of whatever brain state 𝕽(p) corresponds with to indicate the presence of 𝓞, following a 4
simplified version of Fred Dretske’s indicator semantics. Another option is Ruth Millikan’s biosemantics. Both positions will be 
discussed in later chapters.
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Chapter 2 
In this chapter I will finish laying the groundwork for my argument by setting out the metaphysical stakes in 
the contemporary philosophy of mind debate. Most of the theories I consider are naturalistic, and thus are 
situated within physicalist ontologies. This figures in the theory form constraint from Chapter 1. I will then 
introduce explaining intentionality as a desideratum for a theory of cognition. From there I will be able to 
explore whether the account of mental representation that emerges is consistent with the physicalist 
background and explanatory aims of such a theory. I will conclude that it is not, and that this shows some of 
the commitments among theory form, desiderata and pre-theoretical intuitions are in conflict. 
2.1 Physicalism, Dualism and Naturalism 
The form of a theory includes the ontology within which the theory is embedded. All the theories of mental 
representation which I consider in this essay are formulated against a background physicalist ontology. To 
understand how this ontology impacts the notion of mental representation it is necessary to set out 
physicalism. Physicalism is in competition with dualism as the primary ontology of mind. Therefore, I will 
explicate physicalism in relation to dualism. 
 Theorising about the mind begins with talk of things like ‘thoughts’, ‘beliefs’ and ‘intentions’. 
Though these ways of speaking are successful, via folk psychology, this need not imply mental entities and 
propositional attitudes are part of our ontology (Dennett, 1969: 9-14). It is important to bear in mind this 
distinction between ways of talking about the mental and what there is. This leaves it an open question 
whether or not there are such things as beliefs. Moreover, even if mental talk is useful because it refers to 
actual entities this still need not imply there is a world of mental things independently of the physical world. 
One can be a physicalist and still acknowledge the necessity of “non-physical aspects of existence and non-
physical truths” in a system of explanation (Poland, 1994: 12). 
 To a first approximation, physicalism says that everything that there is can ultimately be explained in 
terms of the entities of physics (Crane and Farkas, 2004: 603-604). Three versions of this general position 
are useful to consider here: reductive physicalism, non-reductive physicalism and eliminativism. 
 Eliminativists hold that the physical exhausts what there is and physics says all there is to say about 
the world (Poland, 1994: 12). To put this in terms of mental talk versus mental being, the eliminativist holds 
that mental terms are not referring or even useful (Churchland, 1981). They will ultimately be replaced by 
accurate physical descriptions.  
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 Reductive physicalists hold that there are mental things, like mental properties such as ‘pain’, but 
that these can be reduced to some physical properties or physical states. Unlike eliminativism, this position 
does not denigrate the use of mental talk. The paradigmatic statement of this sort of view is identity theory 
(Kim, 1996: 52-60). A mental state like being in pain simply is identical with a particular physical state, like 
having one’s C-fibres firing. This is an ‘ontological reduction’ where mental properties like being in pain are 
reduced to physical properties. The hallmark of the reductive physicalist is that they hold there are no non-
physical properties (Kim, 1996: 212). 
 The most widely held physicalist view, and the most important for my discussion, is non-reductive 
physicalism. In contrast to reductive physicalists, non-reductive physicalists hold that there are non-physical 
properties, including all the commonsense mental properties like being in pain. Though these are supposed to 
be irreducible to physical properties, all mental properties are held to be ultimately dependent on the 
physical. Fixing all the physical properties in the world would simultaneously determine all the mental 
properties (Poland, 1994: 16). To introduce some terminology from Jeffrey Poland, non-reductive 
physicalists hold that everything is ontologically grounded in the physical domain. Poland conceives of a 
“hierarchically structured system of objects grounded in a physical basis by a relation of realisation” (1994: 
18). To say all attributes are realised by physical attributes is just to say that for any attribute we can specify 
it by specifying the arrangement(s — for there may be many different physical arrangements which entail 
that the attribute of being brittle is instantiated, for example) of underlying physical constituents. Thus non-
reductive physicalism claims that mental properties exist, but that they supervene on physical properties. 
 Further, non-reductive physicalism claims that all phenomena are explanatorily grounded in the 
physical. This means that, though some mental phenomena can be explained in higher-level psychological 
terms for example, nevertheless the psychological phenomena are traceable to ultimate physical facts, the 
obtaining of which then explains those phenomena. Psychological facts supervene on the physical. 
Phenomena and regularities in physics ultimately form the bedrock on which explanations at all levels of 
generality rest, according to the physicalist (Poland, 1994: 21). However, this is not to say we might be able 
to explain, say, psychological laws — if such there are — in the language of physics. 
 So non-reductive physicalism is the position that everything is “dependent on, supervenient upon, 
and realised by physical phenomena”(Poland, 1994: 22). When I talk about physicalism in this essay I will 
refer to this non-reductive variant, unless otherwise specified: 
 15
Michael Hegarty
Physicalism: (i) there are non-physical, ‘mental’ properties which are explanatorily valuable and 
physically non-reducible but, (ii) all mental properties supervene on the physical and (iii) all mental 
properties are realised by physical facts. 
Physicalism is compatible with the view that there are non-mental properties, so long as those non-mental 
properties are shown to depend upon, supervene on and be realised by the physical. It is only this realisation 
and supervenience requirement which separates it from a form of dualism which combines substance 
monism with non-reducible, foundational mental properties (Kim, 1996: 228). This is Property Dualism, the 
view that mental properties are ‘emergent’ from the physical, such that they can vary independently of their 
physical basis. Emergentism says that the correlations between physical states and mental properties are 
brute facts not reducible to, or explainable in virtue of, their physical bases (1996: 52).  
 The close similarity between Physicalism and Property Dualism leaves a grey area for mental 
properties. As Jaegwon Kim notes, emergentists might deny that Physicalism adequately explains the 
relationship between mental properties and their physical bases if, say, it claims C-fibres firing just is (or 
causes) pain. The real explanatory work needed is to say why the sensation of pain is how it is rather than a 
tickle (1996: 52-53). 
 Most philosophers I consider in this essay claim to offer naturalistic theories of the mind. Naturalism 
is less well-defined than Physicalism, though it is broadly taken to fit alongside some form of physicalism, 
and to deny dualism. To best characterise the ontological commitments of these philosophers I will try to 
explicate what I think they have in mind: broadly, that there is no place in the world for supernatural entities. 
Much naturalistic philosophy relies on the principle of causal closure under physics: the idea that all physical 
effects have sufficient physical causes (Yalowitz, 2014). This in turn means that anything that has physical 
effects must be physical too. Naturalists generally affirm causal closure alongside side the view that all 
events are ultimately supervenient on the physical. They are then in the business of searching for physical 
causes of, and explanations for, effects we speak of as mental. 
 It is usually supposed that mental representations are both intentional (see §2.2) and bear semantic 
properties, and that neither intentionality nor the basis of semantic properties is to be found in nature. Thus 
the naturalist seeks to recover semantic and intentional properties by explaining how representations acquire 
them from more basic, non-intentional and non-semantic physical things in the world (Ramsey, 2007: 18). As 
Fodor (1984) puts it:  
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The worry about representation is… that the semantic/intentional properties of things will fail to 
supervene upon their physical properties. What is required to relieve the worry is therefore, at a 
minimum, the framing of naturalistic conditions for representation. […] [W]hat we want at a 
minimum is something of the form ‘R represents S’ is true iff C where the vocabulary in which 
condition C is couched contains neither intentional nor semantical expressions. (p 232)  
  
This means that explicating condition C in purely physicalist, naturalist terms (without using intentional or 
semantic terms) is the aim of a naturalistic theory of mental representation. This is the link between 
naturalism and Physicalism for my purposes. Henceforth, I will take naturalistic approaches to affirm 
Physicalism and refer to this position generally as ‘representational naturalism’. 
 With the these definitions in hand I can detail what role they play in my argument. My claim is that a 
naturalistically conceived C can never make ‘R represents S’ true unless some of the shared pre-theoretical 
commitments we hold about minds, representations and intentionality are sacrificed. The choice is ultimately 
between intentionality and Physicalism because accounting for some of the intuitive commitments around 
representation is incompatible with representational naturalism due to the demands of adhering to 
Physicalism. 
 This requires arguing that something we take to be central to representation will not submit to 
representational naturalism. This amounts, I think, to specifying a counterexample to Physicalism. As Poland 
writes, if there are “higher-level phenomena that admit of non lower-level explanation… [this] provides 
direct counter-examples to physicalism and must be avoided if the programme is to be successful.” (1994: 
23) I think the following necessary condition must be fulfilled for some phenomenon to be a 
counterexample: 
Counterexample: if there exists some x — where x is an object, property or relation — and (i) x does 
not supervene on the physical, or (ii) x cannot be explained in lower-level physical terms, then x is a 
counterexample to Physicalism. 
However, in principle one can argue that Counterexample is necessary but not sufficient to identify a true 
counterexample to Physicalism. Maybe our currently incomplete physics is incapable of explaining a mental 
phenomenon which is a Counterexample. This is not enough to prove future physics will never be able to 
explain it. One response to this is to argue that the mental phenomenon in question is not something physics 
might hope to explain. As we shall see, intentionality is often taken to be one such phenomenon (Fodor, 
1987: 97).  
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 Thus a Counterexample seems unable to definitively refute Physicalism. But by the same token 
defenders of Physicalism are prevented from giving knock-down arguments that a Counterexample will 
ultimately be explained in physicalist terms. A Counterexample therefore at best lends weight to the claim 
that there are foundational mental phenomena in line with Property Dualism, to the detriment of Physicalism, 
but without being decisive against it. 
 In the next section I will set out one crucial desideratum — explaining intentionality — which a 
theory of cognition positing mental representations should meet. I will ultimately claim that the failure to 
explain intentionality means it is a Counterexample to Physicalism, and that recognising this leaves us with a 
straight choice between abandoning representational naturalism, or reevaluating our pre-theoretical 
intuitions. 
2.2 Intentionality 
So far I have described thoughts and representations as ‘being about’ their represented objects by having 
some content. The idea of representational content, or ‘aboutness’, is captured by the technical term 
‘intentionality’ (Crane, 2003: 30). Though some philosophers argue intentionality is better construed as 
‘directedness’ I will think of it primarily as ‘aboutness’, as do the naturalistic philosophers I focus on here 
(Crane, 1998a: 233). Following Ramsey, I will assume that representations are the bearers of intentionality. 
One of the explanatory goals of a theory of cognition is to explain how mental states are intentional. 
Representations are posited to do this. Thus I will take explaining intentionality as one desideratum a 
representational theory should meet, in line with the framework established in Chapter 1. I will examine 
whether representational naturalism can support a consistent notion of representation when aiming at this 
explanatory goal.  
 As shown in the Fodor quotation in §2.1, intentionality cannot be treated as basic under Physicalism 
— it must be explained in physical terms. Being intentional is a property of things. Therefore it is one of 
those properties which either supervenes on, or is emergent from, the physical. 
 Intentionality was introduced into contemporary philosophy by Franz Brentano who claimed that 
every mental phenomenon was characterised by ‘intentional inexistence’ (Brentano, 1995: 68). “Every 
mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same 
way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in 
hate hated, in desire desired and so on,” he wrote in explanation of ‘intentional inexistence’. For Brentano 
intentional inexistence — or simply ‘intentionality’ — was “characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. 
No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it”. 
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 Brentano’s claim has been quoted and discussed widely, and ‘intentional inexistence’ forms the basis 
for the study of intentionality in contemporary philosophy. ‘Inexistence’ here means, roughly, an existence in 
something else. In this case, objects or states of affairs thought about have intentional inexistence in that they 
exist in the act of thought. Though the things one thinks about need not exist in the real world because the 
object thought about and the content of the thought are distinct, the content of one’s thought always exists.  
 I will follow Tim Crane and distinguish ‘intentional object’ and ‘object of thought’. The intentional 
object is what one thinks, while the object of thought is what that thought is about (Crane, 2001: 22). My 
thought about beer in the fridge is about the beer and the fridge — i.e., the beer itself is the object of thought 
— while my mind is, to speak metaphorically, directed on the intentional object which represents the beer in 
the fridge but is not itself beer in a fridge. Crane also holds that intentional objects are always presented in 
some particular way in thought. He calls this the ‘aspectual shape’ of the intentional object. Fred Dretske 
(1995) captures this idea well: 
In thinking about a ball I think about it in one way rather than another — as red not blue, as round 
not square, as stationary not moving. These are the aspects under which I think of the ball… Our 
mental states not only have a reference, an aboutness, an object (or purported object) that forms their 
topic; they represent that object in one way rather than another. When an object is represented, there 
is always an aspect under which it is represented. (pp30-32) 
I can think about the beer in a number of different ways — under different aspectual shapes — but I must 
always think about it in some way. Irrespective of the aspectual shape, my thought about the beer always 
corresponds with the same beer. 
 Brentano is usually taken to defend what is known as ‘Brentano’s Thesis’: all and only mental 
phenomena, or states, exhibit intentionality (Crane, 1998b: 819). Brentano’s view was that the mental is 
irreducibly intentional (Crane, 2001: 12). In analytic philosophy, Brentano is understood to be claiming that 
intentionality is a criterion for distinguishing between entities in the world: anything exhibiting intentionality 
cannot be a physical entity (Crane, 1998b: 817-818). However, if we understand intentionality in terms of 
aboutness there are myriad examples of non-mental things which are still intentional: words, pictures and 
maps are three common non-mental things with apparent intentional properties. These simple 
counterexamples suggest Brentano’s Thesis must be wrong. In answer to these well-motivated concerns, it 
has become commonplace to distinguish between original and derived (or derivative) intentionality. It is a 
popular idea that physical objects like maps and roadsigns are about things in a way derivative on the 
contents of thoughts. According to Alex Byrne: “A thing has derivative intentionality just in case the fact that 
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it represents such-and-such can be explained in terms of the intentionality of something else; otherwise it has 
original intentionality.” (Byrne, 2006: 408)       
 The original/derived intentionality distinction raises another important issue. Maps and roadsigns 
represent and succeed in being about things other than themselves only by virtue of being interpreted by 
agents with some knowledge or understanding of how to take those symbols as standing for something else. 
Without this knowledge no representation can occur; reading a map without a key is impossible. But as 
interpreters seem essential to the representing abilities of symbols with derived intentionality, this means 
there must be agents with minds to bestow derived intentionality on those symbols.  
 So long as we can appeal to an interpreter with a mind we can satisfactorily explain how symbols 
function as representations. This view makes representing a 3-place relation between representation, object 
represented and interpreter.  However, this model will not do for explaining original intentionality. If we 5
import the 3-place relation directly into minds it loses its explanatory power. We set out to explain the 
intentionality of minds, a property only minds were supposed to have. Positing an interpreter with a mind to 
interpret the internal intentional symbol (the mental representation) leads to circularity because the internal 
interpreter seemingly has to have a mind — with intentional capabilities —  to perform its interpretative role. 
This leads to a vicious ‘Homunculus Regress’. Avoiding this is a major obstacle to any theory of mental 
representation: 
Homunculus Regress: any theory of mental representation which requires positing an agent with a 
mind to interpret the representation leads to vicious infinite regress. 
Closely linked with Homunculus Regress is another pitfall for theories of intentionality and, concomitantly, 
of theories of mental representation. No theory of intentionality or mental representation can invoke 
intentional terms in its account or definition of representation or intentionality, or will also run in a circle.  
 What is an ‘intentional term’? This is simply a term in language which is used to label an (original) 
intentional state. I introduced this discussion by saying that thoughts and other mental states are held to be 
intentional. Intentional terms are linguistic terms used to refer to or report such mental states. Examples 
include ‘believes’, ‘knows’, and ‘perceives’. 
 A view discussed at length by von Eckardt (Barbara von Eckardt, What is Cognitive Science?, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 5
147-195).
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 Roderick Chisholm (1974) presents an influential discussion of intentional talk. He recasts 
Brentano’s Thesis into a linguistic form and claims that reports of intentional states all result in sentences 
that are intensional in the logical sense. One of Chisholm’s motivations in doing this is to recreate in a 
linguistic form the fact that intentional states are about things which may or may not exist, just like 
intensional sentences can be about things without their subjects having to exist. 
 Chisholm’s work is important because contemporary analytic philosophy has largely followed his 
interpretation of intentionality (Crane, 1998b: 818). It is also useful because of his detailed discussion of 
intentional terms. No definition or account of intentionality can include an intentional term at risk of being 
circular. By extension, as all mental representations are intentional, no definition or account of mental 
representation can include an intentional term for the same reason. Ultimately, I think this comes to the same 
thing as the Homunculus Regress: intentional terms are all agent-involving terms, so any mention of them in 
a definition of mental representation thereby invokes some full-blown agent with a mind. Thus the definition 
fails to be informative.  
 For the representational naturalist an acceptable account of mental representation or (original) 
intentionality would explain the phenomenon in terms of lower-level and more fundamental capacities. Note 
that intentional talk is all personal-level vocabulary. This means that an explanation of intentionality, and 
hence mental representation, cannot appeal to persons or phenomena on the personal level. Homunculus 
Regress occurs when explanations or definitions invoke personal-level concepts and vocabulary when a 
subpersonal explanation is sought. Preventing this mixing of levels of explanation is precisely why Dennett 
introduced the personal/subpersonal distinction in the first place (1969: 93-97).  
 If, as Ramsey and others hold, mental representations are subpersonal posits in theories of cognition 
which are supposed to explain intentionality, it is clearly a major error to invoke personal-level concepts like 
‘seeing that’ or ‘believing that’ in a theory of mental representation. Subpersonal explanations are supposed 
to operate below the level of persons and are reductive explanations which should explain what we observe 
at the level of persons in terms of things which are at a more basic level than persons. I will ultimately 
question whether this strategy can work for mental representation. 
 As a final important point, Chisholm used his linguistic formulation of intentionality and argued that 
intentional phenomena like believing and perceiving cannot be specified in non-intentional terms (1974: 
180ff). This supports Brentano’s Thesis that mental phenomena are irreducibly intentional. Chisholm 
concluded from this that, as the language of physics has no room for intentional terms, then reduction of 
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intentional phenomena to physical phenomena can never succeed. In other words, the intentional by its 
nature resists reduction to the physical, and so reductive physicalism is false (Crane, 1998b: 818). 
 In Word and Object, W. V. Quine makes a similar point to Chisholm but reaches a different 
conclusion. In contrast to Chisholm, who held that the indispensability of intentional ways of speaking 
suggested intentionality was a ‘mark of the mental’ (1974: 181), Quine protested that the apparent 
irreducibility of intentional ways of speaking was an argument for the unreality of intentionality. He wrote: 
“One may accept the Brentano thesis either as showing the indispensability of intentional idioms and the 
importance of an autonomous science of intention, or as showing the baselessness of intentional idioms and 
the emptiness of a science of intention.” (Quine, 1960: 221) Chisholm’s and Quine’s work on intentionality 
thus presents a dilemma (Crane, 1998b: 818):  
Chisholm-Quine Dilemma: intentionality cannot be reduced to physical processes or talk, hence 
reductive physicalism can never explain it. Therefore either intentionality is real and reductive 
physicalism is false, or intentionality is illusory. 
Recall that Physicalism has three parts: (i) there are non-physical, ‘mental’ properties which are explanatorily 
valuable and physically non-reducible, (ii) all mental properties supervene on the physical, and (iii) all 
mental properties are realised by physical facts. As I characterised it here, intentionality is a mental property. 
If we lack an adequate account of how intentionality supervenes on and is realised by the physical then 
intentionality appears to be a Counterexample. As I pointed out in the last section, a Counterexample does 
not demonstrate that the non-reductive Physicalism is false, but does strongly suggests a stalemate between 
Physicalism and Property Dualism. 
 As Crane notes, most of the early work on mental representation and content concentrated on finding 
a way between the horns of the Chisholm-Quine Dilemma (1998b: 818). The popular strategy has been to try 
to reconcile intentional realism and cognitivism with representational naturalism. Rather than side with 
Quine against intentional talk, or with Chisholm for the irreducibility of the intentional, work focused on a 
naturalistic account of intentionality via explaining the content of mental representations. Therefore the 
stakes are high in finding a physical basis for intentionality: fail and Physicalism and Property Dualism 
become almost equally plausible ontologies of mind. 
 The remainder of this essay will argue that representational naturalism has failed. There are two 
reasons for this. Firstly, theories of content fail to yield content sufficiently determinate to play the causal-
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explanatory role required of it in cognitivist explanations. Secondly,  those theories also fail to convince that 
they have Explanatory Purchase: they fail the JDC. I will suggest one amendment to (MR2) which seems to 
satisfy JDC Pass and thereby solve this problem. However, this amendment introduces intentional talk into 
the definition and thereby fails to be the naturalistic explanation sought to navigate the Chisholm-Quine 
Dilemma. I will suggest that much criticism of theories of representation ultimately stems from a failure to 
appreciate the incompatibility of the irreducible intentionality buried deep in our intuitions about the mental, 
and the constraints of Physicalism and hence of representational naturalism. 
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Chapter 3 
To recap, in Chapter 1 I set out a framework viewing mental representations as posits in theories of cognition 
constrained by the theory’s form, the desiderata it seeks to explain, and pre-theoretical intuitions. For a 
cognitivist explanation of behaviour to succeed, representational content must be determinate to play a 
causal-explanatory role. Moreover, according to Ramsey’s job description challenge (JDC) a representation 
must be used as a representation — whatever that functional role amounts to — in virtue of that particular 
content. In Chapter 2 I drew out the Chisholm-Quine Dilemma and argued that intentionality seems to serve 
as a Counterexample to Physicalism in the absence of a convincing naturalistic account of mental 
representation. Such an account would require explaining mental representation in non-intentional terms or 
face a vicious Homunculus Regress. This chapter will consider two families of naturalistic theory which 
attempt to navigate the Chisholm-Quine Dilemma. I will argue they ultimately fail to recover content 
sufficiently determinate to figure in cognitivist explanations, and that in any case they use only pseudo-
representations because the theories lack Explanatory Purchase and fail the JDC. I begin in §3.1 with a 
discussion of what common pre-theoretical intuitions constrain naturalistic theories of mental representation. 
3.1 The Intuition Constraint on Mental Representation 
‘Representation’ is not a purely technical term as ‘intentionality’ is. Rather, our notion of mental 
representation is influenced by our pre-theoretical understanding of non-mental representations. This derives 
from many sources. Portraits, statues and other works of art often aim to represent by resembling their 
represented objects. Sheet music represents the symphony through a rule-based relationship between the 
symbols on the page and the notes produced by the interpreting musician. I have considered the theory-
specific constraints on mental representation — theory form and desiderate — already. The third — pre-
theoretical intuitions — comes from our experience of everyday representations like portraits and sheet 
music. This section will draw out two important such intuitions, and subsequent sections will show how 
theories of representation rely on them for better or for worse. My main contention is that, given their status 
as intuitions, they are not sacrosanct and we have the choice to reject them in the face of theories which are 
inconsistent with them yet possess explanatory power. 
 Many analyses of mental representation begin by looking at everyday representations. Fred Dretske 
compares representation to ‘natural signs’ such as smoke indicating fire (1986). Fodor’s LOT (1975) models 
mental representation on natural language. Each everyday representation we are familiar with is non-mental 
and, as I suggested in the last chapter, they often require interpreters with minds to make them meaningful. 
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Meaning is always, in a sense, relative to some agent which a representation has meaning for. This gives us 
one important pre-theoretical intuition: 
(PT1): (mental) representations are intuitively representations for some interpreter.  
Many philosophers subscribe to this view. For example, Ruth Millikan writes: “The notion of a sign makes 
intrinsic reference to a possible interpreter… There are no signs without potential interpreters.” (Millikan, 
1984: 118) Others who endorse this include C. S. Peirce (1931) and the early Robert Cummins (1983). 
Deniers of (PT1) include Daniel Dennett (1978) and the later Robert Cummins (1996). 
 (PT1) is best captured by conceptualising representing as a 3-place relation involving representation, 
represented object, and interpreter. But this opens up such an account to the Homunculus Regress. Strategies 
to overcome this centre around making the internal interpreter of the mental representation sufficiently 
‘dumb’ (non-intentional) so that it does not have all the properties of a full-blown mind. Attempts at 
following this idea include homuncular functionalism (Dennett, 1978; Lycan, 1981),  Millikan’s 6
Teleosemantics (1984; 1989), and Ramsey’s ‘mindless strategy’ (of which more will be said later). 
 Ramsey’s discussion of the JDC shows that representations must have determinate content and be 
used in virtue of that content to play their causal-explanatory roles. In the next section I will explain how 
accounts of mental representation which accept (PT1) — by conceptualising representing as a 3-place 
relation — face severe problems in balancing sufficient content determinacy with avoiding the Homunculus 
Regress. 
 Another pre-theoretical intuition which dominates accounts of mental representations uses the same 
basic idea of Brentano’s Thesis that all and only minds have intentionality. The predominant feeling among 
philosophers is that there is something special about minds which entails a sharp separation between things 
with minds and things without minds. It is supposed that any adequate account of intentionality must capture 
how it is that minds are different in some privileged way: 
(PT2): minds have some property over and above non-minds which allows them to be about other 
things in a way more fundamental than artefacts like maps are about things. 
 For criticism see (Cummins, 1983: 92).6
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Note that (PT2) is not simply a restatement of the concept of intentionality. It is a logical possibility that 
minds are on one end of a sliding scale of intentionality, and that they simply have more of whatever 
intentionality is than something minimally intentional like a lower animal’s mental state. Nevertheless, 
philosophers have long advanced the intuition in (PT2) that minds do have some special property, and that 
any adequate theory of mind must capture how they are importantly different from non-minds. Philosophers 
who endorse (PT2) include Brentano, John Haugeland (1981), Alex Morgan (2015), and Jerry Fodor (1987). 
Philosophers who deny (PT2) include Dennett,  Dretske (1981),  Millikan (1984),  and, I suggest, also Alex 7 8 9
Morgan (2015). 
 (PT2) implies that non-mental things cannot be intentional in a strong sense (Jacob, 2014). This 
corresponds more or less with the distinction between original and derived intentionality. This seems to be in 
tension with the very essence of the naturalist, physicalist approach to navigating the Chisholm-Quine 
Dilemma. As Crane (1998b) puts it: “Some philosophers want to locate the basis of intentionality among 
certain non-mental causal patterns in nature.” ‘Locating’ intentionality in the physical world is a useful 
metaphor for the representational naturalist project. But a moment’s reflection suggests this is hard to 
reconcile with (PT2). On Brentano’s view, intentionality is a property supposed to somehow be the preserve 
of minds alone. Locating the basis of intentionality in nature is, by definition, grounding intentionality in 
things that need not be mental. For example, Dretske (1981: vii) invokes natural information and causation in 
his approach to grounding intentionality.  This means that there is nothing stopping non-minds from 10
participating in relations which are supposed to yield intentionality. This is in tension with the spirit of (PT2).  
 But it is hard to see how naturalising intentionality could proceed any other way. To get rid of 
supernatural-seeming unanalysed mental concepts or terms in an explanation the only option is to describe 
them in physical terms (unless you eliminate them altogether). But this entails opening up the possibility that 
non-mental things are intentional. Representational naturalism seems to erase the strict dividing line between 
mental and physical by putting mental properties on a continuum of things with the physical. This is a very 
important point, so for ease of reference I will dub it the Naturalistic Intentionality Thesis: 
 See Fodor’s reconstruction of Dennett’s criticisms in his (1987).7
 Arguably: “… all information-processing systems [including, for Dretske, thermostats and other obviously non-mental systems] 8
occupy intentional states of a certain low order.” (Dretske, 1981: 172)
 Also arguably. Millikan places thought on a spectrum of all intentional icons, including words and natural signs in her (1984).9
 He claims no interpreter is needed. Information is “independent of its actual or potential use by some interpreter” (1981: vii). 10
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Naturalistic Intentionality Thesis: representational naturalism cannot take identity between physical 
and intentional states as a primitive, or make use of unanalysed mental or intentional concepts in 
explaining intentionality. Consequently it surrenders the power to account for the privileged 
difference between minds and non-minds by placing intentionality on a continuum with the physical. 
This point comes back to the common ground between Physicalism and Property Dualism. It may be that 
certain physical things with certain compositions just do instantiate the property of being intentional, and this 
is supervenient on their physical constitution. But in the absence of an explanation why this arrangement of 
physical things does have that mental property there is still room for the Property Dualist to argue such 
properties are simply emergent from the physical, and in fact irreducible and fundamental. 
 Some representational naturalists wishing to locate intentionality in the world take it to be a 2-place 
relation between representation and represented object. This avoids the Homunculus Regress but at the cost 
of requiring some objective, naturalistic notion of meaning. Moreover, it clearly denies (PT1) — though this 
is a price many deem worth paying. It is at best unclear if the 2-place relation view can maintain (PT2), 
though it seems that taking representation to be a 2-place relation requires locating meaning or intentionality 
as an objective quantity somewhere in the physical world. Therefore it seems strongly committed to the 
Naturalistic Intentionality Thesis.  
 I contend that many philosophers seek to incorporate one or both of (PT1) and (PT2) in their 
accounts of mental representation. Many accounts are criticised for not adhering to one or other. Failure to 
properly mark the difference between minds and non-minds captured in (PT2) is a frequent form of criticism, 
as I shall detail. I think both intuitions are in tension, if not outright contradiction, with representational 
naturalism. Moreover, I think the prevalence of both intuitions is at the root of the Chisholm-Quine Dilemma.  
 In the coming sections I will consider Fred Dretske’s and Ruth Millikan’s attempts to negotiate the 
Dilemma and argue that both suffer problems of content indeterminacy and lack of Explanatory Purchase, 
and so ultimately fail the JDC. Both approaches weaken intentionality so as to break radically with (PT2), 
while Dretske’s approach denies (PT1) altogether. Millikan’s approach pays lip service to (PT1) but fails to 
either solve the content indeterminacy problem or pass the JDC without supposing the interpreter is 
intentional, thereby succumbing to the Homunculus Regress. Thus, my discussion will criticise Dretske and 
Millikan along these lines.  
 However, alongside this criticism I will also defend their approaches against a common, but 
unwarranted, criticism. It seems to me that any naturalistic account of mental representation must embrace 
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the Naturalistic Intentionality Thesis. I will argue that a corollary of this is that any such theory cannot be 
criticised for failing to meet (PT2). Explaining intentionality and representation naturalistically must involve 
locating intentionality — and hence minds — on a continuum with non-minds. To pursue a naturalistic 
approach requires accepting that a privileged division between mental and non-mental might not be 
recovered. To presume otherwise is a confusion I will criticise some philosophers for succumbing to. Thus 
some attacks on Millikan, Dretske and other naturalistic accounts are ultimately incoherent. 
3.2 Dretske’s Indicator Semantics 
Dretske develops his naturalistic theory of mental content across books and articles published between 1981 
and 1988, with modifications on a general theme based on two notions: the transmission of information, and 
indicator function. The essence of Dretske’s proposal is that some brain state, A, represents some object or 
state of affairs in the external environment, B, in virtue of the relation that obtains between A and B. This 
relation depends on A having a function to represent, or indicate, the presence (or state) of B. A then is 
tokened reliably given the presence of B — it is reliably caused by B — and, by virtue of this causal relation, 
A comes to represent or indicate B.  
 The variations across the different iterations of Dretske’s account concern how to account for A’s 
function being to indicate or represent B. In 1981 the function of A is set during a ‘learning period’ for the 
organism. Exposure to instances of B is, loosely, supposed to result in the training of A to respond 
differentially to B, thereby settling A’s function. In 1986 an appeal to teleology replaces the ‘learning period’: 
Dretske supposes that A comes to have the function of indicating B through a process of natural selection: the 
function of indicating B evolved to aid the organism’s survival. The notion of A responding to the 
information relayed by the presence of B is a common thread in Dretske’s accounts. 
 The above is a brief summary of Dretske’s key ideas. Important to recognise is how objective natural 
information permits the conceptualisation of representation as a 2-place relation without need of an 
interpreter. A acquires the function of indicating the presence of B because B carries natural information — 
for example, ‘smoke means fire’ — which amounts to a lawful causal covariance (Godfrey-Smith, 1989: 
543). Fixing A’s indicating function by either teleology or learning results in a lawful covariance of A with B.  
 Dretske tries to avoid the Homunculus Regress through use of the 2-place relation. This locates 
intentionality in the world via the notion of natural information, thereby eroding the division between mental 
and non-mental in line with the Naturalistic Intentionality Thesis. Consequently, Dretske’s approach denies 
(PT2) and opens a gap between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ intentionality. It is not obvious how ‘strong’ 
intentionality can be recovered (Ramsey, 2007: 123-124). This consequence is highlighted in Dretske’s 1981 
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account, where he explicitly distinguishes a continuum of intentionality all the way from the “first order of 
intentionality” which is common to “all information-processing systems” including thermostats and 
voltmeters, to the “third order of intentionality” exhibited by states like belief and knowledge (1981: 
172-173). 
 Is the explanatory payoff worth it? I think it is not; Indicator Semantics struggles with problems of 
content indeterminacy and doesn’t pass the JDC. To see this, consider an expanded picture of how the 
account works. Dretske proposes that signals carry information about the state of something they lawfully 
indicate. It is this lawful indication which is fixed by teleology or learning. For example, it is lawful that a 
(correctly functioning) petrol gauge only points in the red when the petrol tank is empty. The signal s is F = 
‘the needle is in the red’ indicates that t is G = ‘the tank is empty’. However, as Godfrey-Smith points out, 
there is no reason to suppose the meaning is as determinate as this (1989: 545). For example, if s is F this 
also lawfully indicates that t is H = ‘the tank is full of air’.  
 The problem stems from the indeterminacy of natural information. A signal — say, the light incident 
on my retinas from a red tulip — carries far more information than is plausibly encoded in a belief state. The 
tulip is red, and the signal carries that information, but also much more: the size, shape, orientation and many 
other properties of the tulip are part of the information carried in the signal. In contrast, intentional states like 
belief have much more determinate contents. Thus, a convincing version of Indicator Semantics should be 
able to explain how unconstrained information signals result in the determinate content of intentional states 
without becoming circular by invoking intentional concepts. 
 To overcome this, Dretske’s 1981 account makes a seemingly circular appeals to ‘background 
beliefs’ (1981: 43; 65). The information of a signal is constrained by the beliefs of the ‘receiver’ of the 
signal.  For example, a radio football commentator’s statement (an example of a ‘signal’ in Dretske’s sense) 11
“Someone has just scored in the 3pm game” carries the information that ‘either an Ajax or a Feyenoord 
player has scored’, contingent on the hearer knowing that the 3pm game is Ajax versus Feyenoord. 
‘Background belief’ is an intentional term and so leads to circularity in specifying intentional content. 
Further, as beliefs are intentional and personal-level entities, Dretske’s requirement that background beliefs 
figure in determining intentional content essentially involves smuggling in an interpreter after all by tacitly 
taking representation to be a 3-place relation. Therefore Indicator Semantics both fails to yield determinate 
content and succumbs to the Homunculus Regress after all by invoking intentional terms to try and 
 Dretske’s original formulation is in terms of information theory and is phrased in terms of the constraint of probabilities given 11
background beliefs. For another statement of my worry, see (von Eckardt, 2012: 36-37).
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individuate content. This means that, without invoking ‘background beliefs’, Indicator Semantics remains 
naturalistic but fails to yield determinate content. However, to yield sufficiently determinate content it 
invokes ‘background beliefs’ and thereby forfeits its naturalistic credentials. 
 The problem can be stated in more formal terms. Intentional content is characteristically fine-grained 
so that co-extensive properties of the same particular thing are readily available as the content of intentional 
states. One can have a belief about the colour or the shape of the tulip alone, for example. Indicator 
Semantics fails to recover this fine-grainedness because only by invoking intentional concepts can indicator 
function seem to distinguish between co-extensive properties. The same signal carries the information that, 
say, ‘x is F and x is G ’, whereas intentional states are ascribed more determinate content, like simply ‘x is 
F’. To pick ‘x is F’ from the signal requires ‘background beliefs’ and thereby causes a Homunculus Regress. 
 So it is clear Indicator Semantics has a problem with content indeterminacy which puts pressure on 
its naturalistic credentials. Another related problem is that it fails the JDC. Ramsey devotes a full chapter to 
arguing this, and I will only briefly restate his main argument here. He claims Indicator Semantics is an 
example of what he calls a ‘receptor’ representation: a state that reliably responds to an obtaining state of 
affairs through lawful covariance. He writes “… a structure can be employed qua nomic dependent or qua 
reliable-respondent without being employed qua information-carrier or, more to the point, qua 
representation.” (2007: 138) The main point is that Dretske presumes the information carried in the relation 
that allows the internal state to covary with the external state of affairs to be essential to that covarying, 
whereas Ramsey argues the informational content is irrelevant for the nomic dependency. For example, the 
state of a thermostat’s bimetallic strip lawfully covaries with the ambient temperature and thereby causes the 
thermostat to switch on or off, but the bimetallic strip is not representational as it simply reliably influences 
the temperature setting of the thermostat. There is no reason to suppose this reliable influence proceeds via 
representation (2007: 136). This is to say Indicator Semantics gains no Explanatory Purchase by invoking 
representations. 
 In summary, Dretske’s use of the 2-place relation denies both (PT1) and (PT2). It also fails to 
recover determinate content without circularly invoking intentional terms, and it fails the JDC. I have 
focused on the 1981 discussion, but as the later amendments replace the ‘learning period’ with teleology, 
leaving the indicator function and natural information notions intact, I think my criticism applies equally to 
the latter accounts. In the next section I will consider Ruth Millikan’s Teleosemantics and assess what stance 
it takes towards (PT1) and (PT2), and whether it passes the JDC and the determinacy of content requirement. 
3.3 Millikan’s Teleosemantics 
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Ruth Millikan develops a complex naturalistic picture of intentionality, representation and mental content in 
her 1984 book Language, Thought, and other Biological Categories, and further in her 1989 article 
‘Biosemantics’. Though there are many striking differences between Dretske’s view and Millikan’s 
approach, in this section I will suggest that there are deep similarities. Moreover, both accounts fail to pass 
Ramsey’s JDC as they gain no Explanatory Purchase from invoking representations: they fail to show that 
representations cause behaviour in virtue of their contents. 
 A general presentation of Millikan’s account can be given with a limited number of essential 
concepts. Firstly, as the name suggests, mental content is ultimately individuated according to a mental 
state’s teleology: states mean what they mean because it is essential for fulfilling their purpose, or function, 
to mean that. Secondly, this purpose is selected for during evolutionary history. Biological mechanisms 
which use intentional content have particular functions because — under conditions which are ‘historically 
Normal’ (a technical term which captures the historical environmental conditions which allowed the 
performance of the function) — they were naturally selected for. Together, these notions combine to yield the 
‘teleofunction’ of a given biological mechanism: its function to perform some job which has been selected 
for through the course of evolutionary history, relative to the obtaining of historically Normal background 
conditions. “To have a teleofunction is to have emerged from a certain sort of history, one involving some 
form of selection,” she writes (1990: 152). For example, a frog’s ‘fly-detecting’ visual-motor mechanism 
evolved in the Normal condition that airborne dark spots in the visual field were reliably correlated with 
flies, hence the frog’s tongue-snapping behaviour reliably led to feeding the frog.  
 Thirdly, Millikan’s account depends on the distinction between a ‘producer’ and ‘consumer’ (or 
‘interpreter’) of a representation. This elastic notion supposes that intentional systems decompose into two 
parts which evolved to work together. The producer’s function is to produce a representation for the 
consumer to consume, or interpret, in aid of performing its function (1990: 157). This is highly abstract, and 
Millikan claims that while producer and consumer can be two internal components of the same system — as 
would seem to have to be the case with mental representations — they can also be entirely separate entities. 
A favourite example of Millikan’s is the bee dance, in which one bee’s ‘dance’ represents the location of 
nectar to another bee. Here the dancing bee is the producer, the dance is the representation, and the watching 
bee is the consumer. 
 This idiosyncrasy occurs because Millikan’s theory, especially as presented in 1984, is intended to be 
highly general. One of her main contentions is that mental representations are simply one subcategory of 
‘intentional icons’ (1984: 12). These include sentences, pictures, bee dances and more or less any other 
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meaningful token. This approach clearly exemplifies the naturalistic strategy of dissolving the barrier 
between mental and non-mental by locating intentionality in the world, which is precisely the denial of 
(PT2).  However, interestingly Millikan seeks to preserve — albeit in a highly naturalistic way — (PT1). 12
The consumer/producer distinction allows Millikan to model representation as a 3-place relation (1984: 85, 
95; 2009: 396). This naturally introduces the Homunculus Regress threat once more, but I will pass over this 
for now. 
 What makes an intentional icon a mental representation? Millikan explains: “… what distinguishes 
representations from more primitive intentional icons is that the mapping values of the elements of 
representations are supposed to be identified.” (1984: 239) ‘Identify’ means: “roughly, understand the 
reference of” (1984: 96). Though this notion of identification is delivered in intentional language 
(‘understand’), suggesting circularity, Millikan ultimately attempts a naturalistic account of identification 
which depends on the correspondence between world and icon for the correct performance of selected-for 
functions. She talks about the identity between two different representations of the same real-world state of 
affairs: an “act of correct identification” is performed by some interpreting device when performance of its 
function requires the device use the icons jointly to successfully perform the function. She writes “the 
interpreting device will be able to accomplish what good it does Normally only because these elements map 
the same” (1984: 242).  
 I am now in a position to state how content is individuated under Teleosemantics.  Intentional icons 
are reliably correlated with how the world is through teleofunctions. Teleofunctions have been selected for 
because they have been historically successful in allowing their consumers to function effectively for the 
proliferation of the organisms that use them exactly because the correlation of the icon with the state of the 
world obtains reliably. Given this obtaining correlation — which Millikan often refers to as ‘semantic rules’ 
— the content of the icon is just what the icon must mean, and must always have meant and have been 
selected to mean, so that the consumer function properly. 
[…] the producer produces a sign that will be true or satisfied only if it maps onto some affair or 
affairs… in the world in accordance with certain ‘semantic’ rules… of correspondence between signs 
and world affairs that have been instantiated in the past when the consumer and producer or their 
ancestors have succeeded in performing their cooperative function(s). (2009: 397) 
Semantic rules hold because they had to have held for evolutionary success. Intentional icons “the referents 
of which are supposed to be identified” are representations. Mental representations are thus inner intentional 
icons which are ‘supposed’ to have their referents identified in the course of the Normal explanation. For 
 Millikan overtly denies the existence of original intentionality — or ‘basic’ intentionality in her terms (1984: 89-90).12
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example, when tying a knot the action’s success depends upon the agent’s identification of the visual and 
tactile representations of the end of the rope as the same actual object (Millikan, 1984: 240). 
 Teleosemantics suffers from an indeterminacy of content just like Indicator Semantics. One problem 
afflicting its appeals to teleology is that it is difficult to specify biological function in a fine-grained enough 
way to get the sort of content imputed in intentional explanations. Consider the example of the frog snapping 
its tongue at dark spots. There are numerous contents which may correspond with the dark spots, such as 
‘fly’ or ‘food’. Yet sticking strictly to teleology would seem to yield a content perhaps as general as 
‘metabolism-satisfying object’, and significantly less specific than is required for most intentional states. 
This is another instance of representational naturalism’s difficulty in dealing with coextensive properties. As 
Richard Hall (1990: 195) puts it: "Darwin cares how many predators you avoid but not what description you 
avoid them under”. Moreover, appeal to the function of the consumer is not as straightforward as it appears. 
Karen Neander worries the system that benefits from the visual representation of the dark spots might be 
some mental capacity in the frog, some aspect of its motor control system, the digestive system that digests 
the food, or even the circulatory system that distributes the nutrients (Neander, 2018). An inability to 
accurately specify the consumer entails an inability to specify content determinately. 
 Indeterminacy of content is one issue, but a bigger problem is that content ascription actually seems 
irrelevant to behavioural explanation. The frog cannot discriminate flies from dark spots to cause its tongue-
snapping, but it does not need to. So long as there are dark spots, the frog reacts. Thus, claiming the dark 
spots are intentional icons at all seems to add nothing to the explanation, contravening the JDC. However, as 
I mentioned, Millikan distinguishes between intentional icons and full-blown representations through the 
identity condition. Thus to show that her proposal qua mental representations fails the JDC I must show that 
her appeal to identification cannot reconstruct ‘strong’ intentionality from the ‘weak’ variety intentional 
icons possess. 
 In Chapter 2 I mentioned that the aspectual shape of an intentional content is something that should 
be explained by a theory of content. This is captured by the fine-grainedness of intentional content extending 
to coextensive properties of the same object. I think that Teleosemantics is unable to explain the aspectual 
shape of intentional content even with Millikan’s appeal to identification. Consider the knot-tying example. 
Identifying the visual and tactile representations of the rope as having the same referent is certainly 
necessary for successfully tying the knot. But to fully explain intentional content then the naturalistic 
description would still — much like the frog example — have to convince us that the agent takes the referent 
of the representation to be precisely the knot in question, not some other kind of object and certainly not 
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nothing in particular. An agent could feasibly succeed in doing the tying so long as its systems are satisfied it 
can feel and see its hands on the same object. The actual recognition of the object’s identity need never enter 
into the explanation of the action beyond this minimal requirement and yet still yield successful knot tying. 
Yet our experience is of taking the object at hand to be one particular thing and not another.  
 To satisfy JDC Pass, describing the knot-tying in representational terms must be explanatorily 
beneficial and the system must use the representations in virtue of their content in causing behaviour. Even 
supposing the teleofunction (whatever that is) used in the knot tying is fine-grained enough to yield the right 
content, if there is no plausible need for the agent to take the representations to represent the knot rather than 
something else, then the representational description is explanatorily otiose. Thus Teleosemantics fails the 
JDC and is only pseudo-representational. 
 I mentioned that Millikan’s use of a 3-place relation threatens a Homunculus Regress. She contends 
that so long as the interpreter need not token a further intentional icon when it performs its 
‘interpretative’ (in, I presume, a loose, non-intentional sense) role — if representations simply cause non-
intentional processes in the consumer —  no regress begins (1984: 90; 2009: 396). For example, if a bee 
interpreting the dance of another responds by simply flying to the location represented, regress is avoided. 
But this suggests the question: why suppose the ‘representation’ was actually representational? Described 
like this, Millikan’s position seems vulnerable to the same criticism Ramsey aimed at Dretske: the so-called 
‘representation’ functions just like a ‘receptor’ in Ramsey’s sense. Yet Millikan is clear that “the part of the 
system which consumes representations must understand the representations proffered to it. […] [T]here 
must be something about the consumer that constitutes its taking the signs to indicate, say, p, q, and r rather 
than s, t, and u.” (1989: 286) 
 Thus we observe a tension in Millikan’s thought. On one hand she admits that a representation 
consumer should take a representation to have a particular content. On the other hand, I argued that 
Teleosemantics is incapable of individuating such determinate content and that this content is explanatorily 
otiose. The overall goal of this essay is to suggest that, because of the Naturalistic Intentionality Thesis, it is 
simply incoherent to expect representational naturalism to simultaneously meet both conditions. Sticking to 
representational naturalism entails that, if representing is conceived of as a 3-place relation, then content can 
never be sufficiently determinate. The interpreter cannot be intentional, on pain of regress, yet without an 
intentional interpreter content seems doomed to be indeterminate. Naturalising the interpreter leads to the 
situation reminiscent of Searle’s Chinese Room: a representation seems to be being used as if it has a 
particular content, but it is not used in virtue of that content. 
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 To summarise, in contrast to Indicator Semantics, Teleosemantics seeks to preserve (PT1) in a 
naturalistic framework. However, both have in common the naturalistic strategy of denying (PT2) and both 
thereby necessarily adhere to the Naturalistic Intentionality Thesis. Neither Dretske nor Millikan see these 
concessions as problematic for their overall goals. However, I have argued that neither can succeed in 
yielding content sufficiently determinate for cognitivist explanation, or succeed in convincing that 
representations are used in virtue of that content. 
3.4 The Distinctively Mental Criticism 
The previous two sections detailed how neither conceiving of representation as a 2-place relation nor a 3-
place relation allows us to adequately individuate representational content, or convince that representations 
are used in virtue of that content, to pass the JDC. Further, both Dretske’s and Millikan’s naturalistic 
approaches deny (PT2). In this section I will suggest this denial gives rise to a common criticism that 
naturalistic approaches label too many intuitively non-mental things as mental. I will use the exposition of 
the problems facing Dretske’s and Millikan’s approaches to show that such criticism is largely ill motivated. 
From the Naturalistic Intentionality Thesis it follows that some seemingly non-mental things are at risk of 
being admitted as mental. Any criticism along these lines is incoherent if the critic also endorses the core of a 
naturalistic project. Explaining why this is allows me to derive my central claim: either we revise some of 
our intuitions or we must drop representational naturalism. 
 If a theory of representation denies (PT2) then the privileged dividing line between mental and non-
mental is dissolved. Thus critics can claim that a theory “casts the net of representationhood too wide, over 
areas on which it has no explanatory purchase”, in the words of one such critic: Alex Morgan (2015). 
Morgan cites criticism of Millikan that interactions between trees are rendered contentful, and that saliva 
represents food as examples where our intuitions are contradicted (2015: 219). Similarly, Godfrey-Smith 
reconstructs an argument against Millikan from Paul Pietroski that there are counterintuitive cases where the 
biologically-determined content of a creature’s representation is something it would in fact be unable to 
perceive, and thus unable to represent (2006: 63). Ramsey criticises Indicator Semantics in the same vein, 
arguing that indicators are pseudo-representational ‘receptors’ which reliably respond to environmental 
factors and hence cause behaviour, but not in virtue of representational content, thereby failing the JDC 
(2007: 118-141). Finally, in a critical article, Morgan argues that Ramsey’s favoured ‘S-representation’ is not 
sufficient for defining representationhood because non-mental creatures use representations in this manner. 
Morgan’s example is of circadian clocks in plants (2015: 238). Such cases emphasise results which break 
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from our intuitions about which things are mental representations, and hence which activities we count as 
mental.  
 I think these criticisms are underwritten by the critics’ commitment to this claim: a necessary 
condition on a theory of mental representation is that it should allow us to distinguish the mental from the 
non-mental. Critics seem to take the mental/non-mental distinction to be an empirical fact which any good 
theory of cognition should account for. However, given the role of pre-theoretical intuitions in constraining 
theories of representation, I suggest this expectation reflects not an incorrigible fact but a manifestation of 
(PT2). Let’s call this the Distinctively Mental Criticism: 
Distinctively Mental Criticism: No theory of mental representation that labels non-mental things as 
mental, or labels non-representational things as representational, or labels non-intentional things as 
intentional, is correct. 
From the above examples of criticism it seems that many agree that if any theory of mental representation is 
vulnerable to the Distinctively Mental Criticism it must be flawed. However, I will show that arguments 
using it against theories of mental representation are in contradiction if they also affirm Physicalism. 
 Both Dretske’s and Millikan’s naturalistic approaches deny (PT2). I argued this denial is a necessary 
part of representational naturalism, which locates intentionality in the world. This is the Naturalistic 
Intentionality Thesis. Further, I claimed this leads to a seemingly unbridgeable gulf between ‘strong’ and 
‘weak’ intentionality. For representational naturalism to succeed, intentionality must be described in physical 
terms. Therefore it is a strange criticism to claim that the fact such theories attribute intentionality to the non-
mental counts against the theory because of the alleged fact — really the intuition (PT2) —  that non-mental 
things aren’t intentional in a strong way. If representational naturalism involves attenuating intentionality so 
that it is found in things we don’t consider mental, we cannot simultaneously criticise theories that attempt 
this strategy for failing to return as outputs all and only those things which we want to characterise as mental.  
 I argue this is because the Distinctively Mental Criticism relies on the assumption that we can pick 
apart the mental from the non-mental. But (original) intentionality is often used as the means of 
distinguishing mental things from non-mental things. Thus, if a theory of mental representation is viewed as 
a way of explaining intentionality, then appealing to a supposed distinction between mental and non-mental 
as a means to tell if the theory is successful or not is circular. 
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 Coming up with an infallible ‘mark of the mental’ is difficult (Kim, 1996: 15-16). Intentionality is 
commonly taken to mark the difference between mental and non-mental, as Brentano’s Thesis shows. 
However this remains problematic as the need to distinguish original and derived intentionality 
demonstrates. The mark of the mental then becomes original intentionality. Is this not somewhat ad hoc? The 
aim was to find some criterion to distinguish between the mental and non-mental. To meet objections that 
intentionality does not apply to all and only mental phenomena, original intentionality is posited. But how do 
we decide which things have original intentionality? It is built into the definition of original intentionality 
that only minds have it, but we lack independent purchase on which things have minds as our original 
question was to find a way to distinguish minds from non-minds. Therefore claiming all and only minds have 
original intentionality is of no help. Thus, in the absence of an independent mark of the mental, there are no 
grounds for the Distinctively Mental Criticism because only a theory of representation could allow us to 
distinguish minds from non-minds — but this distinguishing ability is presupposed in making the Criticism 
in the first place. 
 Consequently, barring appeal to an intuition like (PT2), any critic of a theory of mental 
representation cannot simultaneously complain the theory is open to the Distinctively Mental Criticism and 
also support a naturalistic theory adhering to Physicalism. (PT2) and Physicalism are incompatible (because 
Physicalism just is locating intentionality in the world) and the Distinctively Mental Criticism relies on 
(PT2). Adopting representational naturalism just dissolves the mental/non-mental barrier, which is a denial of 
(PT2). The Distinctively Mental Criticism presupposes (PT2), so any argument using it is inconsistent unless 
it denies Physicalism.  
 Nevertheless, many instances of the Distinctively Mental Criticism — including Morgan’s version 
against Ramsey — are made by philosophers who also adhere to representational naturalism. If my analysis 
is correct there seem to be two options: either (i) we abandon the allure of pre-theoretical intuition and allow 
the explanatory value of theories of cognition in a physicalist ontology to guide us, or (ii) we put faith in the 
strength of the intuition and accept that the Chisholm-Quine Dilemma was correct all along: intentionality 
and Physicalism are incompatible. At best Physicalism and Property Dualism are equally plausible. 
 I have claimed that any argument against a theory of representation using the Distinctively Mental 
Criticism is only valid when conjoined with a denial of Physicalism. Representational naturalism affirms 
Physicalism, and the work of Dretske and Millikan suggests an acceptance of (i). Any philosopher holding 
on to (PT2) while pursuing representational naturalism fails to see their position is inconsistent. Morgan’s 
criticism of Ramsey’s S-representation is an example of this confusion. In this next chapter I analyse their 
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dispute and suggest the motivation for Morgan’s criticism reflects an underlying deficiency with 
representational naturalism, which is a reason to choose (ii) over (i). 
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Chapter 4 
4.1 Morgan’s Criticism of  S-representation 
To pass the JDC a theory must show that representations are used in virtue of some explanatorily relevant 
content. Ramsey claims to identify one notion of representation which passes the JDC: S-representation. S-
representations are structurally isomorphic with their represented objects and work in tandem with the 
mental model conception (2007: 193). A mental model is able to model some domain because it is composed 
of elements which, together, are structurally isomorphic with that domain. In a map of a park the individual 
resembling elements — the lines representing roads, rivers etc. — enable the map as a whole to function as a 
model by being elements in a representational structure isomorphic with the real park. S-representation takes 
this idea and supposes it works equivalently inside one’s head. Using an internal map an agent plans their 
route by using the representation. This is the ‘surrogate’ reasoning mentioned in Chapter 1. For Ramsey, 
“components of the model become representations when the isomorphism is exploited in the execution of 
surrogative problem-solving” (2007: 96). 
 To avoid the Homunculus Regress, Ramsey employs what he calls the ‘mindless strategy’ to show 
that S-representations are used by systems which need not have full-blown minds: “we can have something 
that functions as a representation in a physical system, even if there is no sophisticated built-in learner or 
inference-maker that it serves as a representation for… [S]uch a consumer is little more than a mechanical 
process or device that the representation effects” (2007: 192-193). Ramsey gives an example of a driverless 
car navigating a track using an internal S-representation. First, imagine a car with blacked out windows and a 
driver inside who possesses a map of the track. The map is isomorphic with the track so functions like a 
model of the track to guide the driver’s behaviour navigating the track. The map in this case is the S-
representation.   13
 To employ the mindless strategy, suppose we replace driver and map with a groove inside the car 
which is isomorphic with the shape of the track. Some mechanical system could be set up with a rudder 
tracing the groove, the deflections of which cause appropriate manipulations of the steering wheel. Ramsey 
thinks this amounts to a mindless system using an S-representation. The map is essentially transformed into 
the groove, and the driver’s interpretative role is replaced by a mechanical system which ‘reads’ the groove 
and  thereby steers the car. Ramsey claims “the car is exploiting the isomorphism between the groove and the 
track in much the same way that the driver did [with the map], even though the process is now fully 
 I think Ramsey’s exposition misses out the importance of the agent’s being able to constantly check their progress with relation to 13
their surroundings during navigation through their perceptual faculties. For the sake of argument I will ignore this complication.
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automated and mindless” (2007: 199). The automatic system still exploits an isomorphism between groove 
and track, and this is sufficient for a representational explanation that meets JDC Pass while also avoiding 
the Homunculus Regress. 
 Morgan argues S-representation is necessary, but not sufficient, for mental representation. His 
argument is a Distinctively Mental Criticism: there exist counterexamples which meet the criteria to be 
considered S-representations but which we would not want to call representational. “While 
[S-]representations might count as genuine representations, they aren’t distinctively mental representations, 
for they can be found in all sorts of non-intentional systems such as plants,” Morgan writes (2015: 213). 
 He cites circadian clocks in plants, which he claims are functionally isomorphic with external 
“daylight cues” which let them model the Earth’s rotation period in line with the day-night cycle (2015: 233). 
The clock interfaces with a plant’s ‘motor control systems’ to ‘influence behaviour’. They apparently use 
these clocks ‘offline’ — something we associate with mental representations — to orient their leaves 
overnight (in the absence of the daylight cues) to maximise exposure to morning sunlight. The clocks are 
thus functioning isomorphs and should be considered representations on Ramsey’s account. But Morgan 
argues they “surely don’t count as mental representations, i.e. the vehicles of cognitive processes like 
episodic memory, planning, and mental imagery” (2015: 240). Here it is plain that Morgan expects an 
account of mental representation to mark the difference between mental and non-mental. Ramsey’s S-
representation fails to do so and should be rejected: precisely the structure of the Distinctively Mental 
Criticism. 
 In the previous chapter I argued that if one is a representational naturalist — necessarily affirming 
the Naturalistic Intentionality Thesis and rejecting (PT2) — then one has no grounds to make a Distinctively 
Mental Criticism. Morgan is a representational naturalist so his argument against Ramsey fails. This means 
that Morgan’s issue with Ramsey can be traced back to their stance on (PT2): Morgan affirms it while 
Ramsey denies it. Thus their disagreement reflects not a substantive problem with Ramsey’s theory, or even 
anything about the merits of Morgan’s criticism, but simply is emblematic of an irreconcilable difference in 
their starting assumptions. 
 Ramsey’s view is that a suitable explication of how representations are used by mindless systems is 
sufficient for explaining mental representations. In contrast, Morgan thinks this explication is insufficient if 
there is no ‘distinctively mental’ element in such an account. But Ramsey simply denies there is anything 
more to being a mental representation than being an S-representation in the head. Morgan references private 
correspondence from Ramsey which appears to confirm this: “Ramsey has agreed that circadian clocks in 
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plants might count as [S-]representations; he emphasizes that what’s essential is whether a system is used as 
an internal surrogate, not whether it’s distinctively mental.” (2015: 238) Giving up claim to the ‘distinctively 
mental’ is, I think, just the price one pays for affirming Physicalism. Morgan’s intuitive view of the mind is 
simply incompatible with his preferred ontology. 
 I believe this discussion brings out a conflict of starting assumptions which is generally 
mischaracterised as a difference in explanatory value of equally plausible theories. A Distinctively Mental 
Criticism is only valid when raised by a denier of Physicalism. Therefore, such criticisms raised at naturalists 
by naturalists are really manifestations of philosophers’ differences in intuition about the nature of the 
mental. In other words, to make such a criticism amounts to criticising the way the nature of the mental is 
characterised. But the way the mental is characterised is built into one’s theoretical paradigm, thus one 
cannot make changes to that characterisation without rejecting or radically reworking the basic claims of the 
paradigm itself. As mentioned in the last chapter, one is faced with a hard choice between revising intuitions 
to fit within a physicalist worldview, or accepting that Physicalism may not be a suitable ontology for 
capturing ‘the mental’ — however one construes this. In the next section I will consider why this might be. 
4.2 What Representational Naturalism Lacks 
As I see it, the force of criticisms like Morgan’s against Ramsey come from the fact that representational 
naturalism misses out on an important, but crucial, element of representation. This is something like the 
representation user’s recognition of the representation as representing something in particular.  
 To support this speculation, I return to some of the material discussed earlier. Firstly, according to 
Crane, intentionality has an aspectual shape. A thought is about something and is presented in one’s mind in 
a particular way. Multiple possible ways of presentation are all still ultimately directed on the same object of 
thought, and can involve different coextensive properties of the object. Thus any intentional content-
determining account should have a way of picking between coextensive properties of an object. Secondly, as 
Millikan notes, identification of the referent of a representation is crucial: what seems special about mental 
representation in us is that we are able to identify what is being represented. I argued that Teleosemantics 
lacks the resources to allow the identification of intentional content under such aspectual shapes, as seems 
necessary for a satisfying account of intentionality. Thirdly, Dretske also identifies aspectual shape as 
something to be accounted for in our experience of representation (1995: 30-32). Fourthly, Dretske’s early 
attempts at naturalising representation using a 2-place relation ran into difficulties when picking between 
coextensive properties. I showed that he even had to tacitly invoke intentional terms like ‘belief’ to make up 
this shortfall in his 1981 account. All of this does not prove that some sense of first-person recognition or 
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awareness of what a representation represents is necessary. However, I do take it to indicate that this is at 
least a strongly felt intuition. 
 Even Ramsey’s account suffers from the same problem. On the surface, Ramsey claims 
representation is a 3-place relation with an interpreter. We saw in Chapter 3 that Millikan adopted the same 
strategy but could not see it through because her notion of mental representation failed to pass the JDC. 
There was seemingly nothing about the explanation which required it to be representational by being used in 
virtue of a particular content. I think Ramsey succumbs to the same problem with his ‘mindless strategy’. He 
claims that an S-representation has a particular content and is used in virtue of that content because the 
reasoning done on the mental model could only successfully cause behaviour if the representation did in fact 
represent the thing in the world reasoned about. Thus, use of the representation ensures the isomorphism 
exploited is the correct one. And this only happens because of the state of the world in which the subject 
finds itself. However, as Morgan notes, this merely pushes the question of how the representation has just 
that content deeper into the act of directing the mental model on that state of affairs in the first place (2015: 
224). To get around this, Ramsey makes an appeal to what the explanandum in a cognitive explanation 
actually must be in any given situation (2007: 94). For example, a cognitive explanation of the driver’s 
successful navigation only makes sense if the driver actually did model that particular track navigated. In the 
automated car case it only makes sense that isomorphism of the internal groove with the track navigated 
makes the groove a representation if the groove has been designed to be isomorphic with that particular 
track. It is possible that the groove is accidentally isomorphic with a different track and would also succeed 
in navigating that track. Yet without the intentional designing element to ‘aim’ the isomorphism at that 
particular state of affairs then successful navigation is only accidentally achieved through the isomorphism. 
This then seems insufficient to qualify the groove as a representation of one particular track and not another. 
But, as Morgan notes, this appears to introduce a radical observer-dependence to the content of the 
representation, which evidently just pushes the Homunculus Regress further down the explanatory food chain 
(2015: 224). In a similar manner to Millikan and Dretske before him, Ramsey fails to secure determinate 
content or to pass the JDC by having to smuggle in an intentional notion to fix representational content on 
one state of affairs rather than another. 
 A way out that would solve the indeterminacy of content problem and allow the JDC to be passed, 
while also easing ‘distinctively mental’ worries, would be to introduce some way to account for the 
representation user’s identification of the referent of the representation. Mindless systems can always 
plausibly use representations without requiring them to have any particular meaning, as Chinese Room 
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suggests. For this reason it appears unlikely that any automated, mindless strategy could pass the JDC. But if 
we try to avoid this criticism by introducing a condition that only things with minds can use mental 
representations, we need to appeal to things being minds in the account. Nothing without a mind can identify 
or recognise a representation as having a particular content in the appropriate sense. This strategy can then 
only proceed if representation is a 3-place relation with an interpreter. An interpreter functions by seeing that 
or understanding that the representation represents this state of affairs. How can we build this idea into an 
account of mental representation? 
 The shared failing of naturalistic accounts is that the content ascribed to representations is irrelevant 
for playing a causal-explanatory role, i.e. naturalistic accounts fail the JDC. My solution to ensure content 
does play such a role will be incompatible with Physicalism. 
4.3 ‘Representation as’ 
Morgan’s idea of the ‘distinctively mental’ lacking in Ramsey’s account is not analysed further. He thinks 
that S-representation cannot be correct because non-mental plants appear to be using S-representations. He 
does not propose any condition that would separate the usage of S-representations by things with minds and 
things without minds. In this section I will propose such a condition — ‘representation as’. I think it would 
avoid the grounds for Morgan’s criticism, though I do not think Morgan himself had this in mind or would 
necessarily endorse it because it is overtly anti-naturalist. However, my argument so far in this chapter has 
been that criticisms such as Morgan’s against Ramsey are strictly incoherent when combined with 
representational naturalism. Thus, in even raising the question Morgan is at least tacitly dissatisfied with 
representational naturalism. As I said, either one sticks with naturalism and bites the bullet that one’s 
distinctively mental intuitions must be renounced, or one accepts the intuitions and considers that naturalism 
may be unable to support them. I adopt the latter option in the following. 
 ‘Representation as’ attempts to integrate the aspectual, recognitional aspect of mental representation 
into the picture. It can be formulated, as far as I can see, in intentional terms only and therefore runs 
immediately into the Homunculus Regress unless representational naturalism is abandoned.  
 Dretske mentions something like what I have in mind in his paper ‘Misrepresentation’. He discusses 
sea-dwelling ‘magnetotactic’ bacteria which use magnetic ‘sensors’ to orient their movements using the 
direction of the Earth’s magnetic field. Oxygen-rich water is toxic for them, so they evolved the magnetic 
sensors to keep them directed towards deeper, oxygen-poor waters. Southern and northern varieties of the 
bacterium exist. Northern bacteria align with the direction of geomagnetic north, while southern bacteria 
align against the direction of geomagnetic north to guide them to deep water. You can lure a northern 
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bacterium to its death by placing a bar magnet such that it orients itself against geomagnetic north and 
towards oxygen-rich water. Does this mean that the bacterium misrepresents the direction of geomagnetic 
north, or of oxygen-free water? Dretske (1986) wonders: 
The most that might be claimed is that there is some cognitive slip (the bacterium mistakenly ‘infers’ 
from its sensory condition that that is the direction of oxygen-free water). This sort of reply, 
however, begs the question by presupposing that the creature already has the conceptual or 
representational capacity to represent something as the direction of oxygen-free water […]. (p 30) 
Dretske does not argue that the bacteria are representing in the strong intentional sense required for mental 
representations in human cognition. He wants to build his account on an instance of ‘natural 
misrepresentation’ using the natural information the bacterium uses. But the problem is again one of content 
indeterminacy: the bacterium’s sensors can pick out the direction of geomagnetic north, but what license do 
we have to say that the sensory state indicating this direction has the content ‘oxygen-free water’, ‘direction 
of geomagnetic north’, ’direction of deep water’, or any of various other coextensive properties? Indicator 
Semantics does not give us the resources to pick any of these over any other. Teleosemantics would at least 
yield the content ‘the direction of oxygen-free water’ because this is what the bacterium’s ancestors needed it 
to mean to proliferate. But, as I argued in the last chapter, in neither account is there reason to even require 
any content to explain the bacterium’s ‘behaviour’. There is no explanatory benefit to supposing the 
bacterium represents anything at all, rather than simply responding automatically to the magnetic field like a 
thermostat responds to temperature changes. What would ensure this need? A situation where it is essential to 
the explanation that the system uses the representation as a representation: the necessity of recognition of the 
representation’s referent for the successful functioning of the bacterium, in this instance. 
 Thus it seems finding a way to distinguish when representational explanations are appropriate from 
when they are not is needed. Jerry Fodor has addressed exactly this question. He considers what differences 
there are between intentional and non-intentional creatures in what he calls a ‘primal scene’: some creature, 
A, ‘sees’ (broadly understood: the bacterium ‘sees’ the magnetic field) some particular object, x, that is F 
(instantiates the property of Fness), leading to A’s behaviour, C. I will talk about this in terms of the stimulus, 
x, received by the agent and the relevance of the properties of x in explaining C — properties of the stimulus 
which are then invoked in behavioural explanations. 
 Fodor claims only organisms which can respond to stimulus properties such that the relation between 
behaviour and stimulus property is ‘non-nomic’ warrant intentional explanations (1986: 9-10). This is a 
careful way of saying that the capacity to respond selectively to coextensive properties in non-automatic 
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ways (unlike the magnetotactic bacterium) shows when intentional explanation is appropriate for the creature 
in question. 
 Crucial to this is Fodor’s distinction between nomic and non-nomic properties. A brief gloss: nomic 
properties are those which cause a certain behaviour in the ‘automatic’ sense I have spoken of already, e.g. 
the bacterium’s movements lawfully covary with the magnetic field. Non-nomic properties are all the rest: 
properties of stimuli which are invoked in behavioural explanations but do not lawfully covary with the 
behaviour. Fodor takes physical laws as the paradigm for nomic properties. The bacterium moves with the 
direction the magnetic field identically to how iron filings move in response to a magnetic field. Stimulus 
properties connected by physical laws to behavioural properties are then ‘nomic properties’, while those not 
so connected are non-nomic. Fodor’s point is that any object has indefinitely many properties, but only some 
subset is subject to laws linking them with the behaviour of agents. I presume Fodor would agree that talk of 
‘behaviour’ and ‘agent’ here is understood loosely so as not to question-beggingly tie non-nomic properties 
with all and only intentional agents like people. The aim is to find an outside purchase on which things 
(including rocks, bacteria and people) plausibly have intentional states. 
 If F is non-nomic then “there is no law that relates [x’s] being [F] to A’s behaviour coming to be 
C” (Fodor, 1986: 14). As an example he offers a human responding to a ‘crumpled shirt’: “I see a thing that 
has this property and respond to it in a way that is explained by reference to the fact that the thing has the 
property and that I see it” (1986: 13). This might be a verbal response affirming the crumpled shirt’s 
presence. Unlike the bacterium’s movement in response to the magnetic field, the human’s verbal assent to 
the crumpled shirt is not nomically connected to the shirt’s crumpledness.  
 Fodor claims that a stimulus property being implicated in the explanation of behaviour in the 
absence of a lawful connection between property and behaviour is a “puzzle that motivates the 
representational theory of mind” (1986: 14). For him, explaining “selective response to non-nomic 
properties” is why we posit representations in the first place. It follows that those representations must 
actually represent those properties (determinately, and not others, as we have seen from the JDC) for 
representational explanation to succeed. 
 In the bacterium case the magnetic field indicates both the direction of geomagnetic north (x is F) 
and the direction of oxygen-free water (x is G). To explain the bacterium’s ‘behaviour’ it is irrelevant 
whether x is F or x is G. All that matters is that the bacterium responds to x, not its Fness or Gness — neither 
are relevant to the explanation of behaviour. To justify claiming that the bacterium represents ‘the direction 
of geomagnetic north’ then it would need to respond selectively to the magnetic field in virtue of that 
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property alone, and not simply in virtue of its being a magnetic field. But there is no lawful relation between 
‘indicating geomagnetic north’ and the bacterium’s behaviour. The lawful relation obtains between the 
magnetic field’s being a magnetic field and the bacterium’s magnetic sensor. The bacterium lacks the 
capacity to respond selectively to the non-nomic properties of the magnetic field, hence we should not 
ascribe an intentional explanation in this case. 
 In contrast, if I lend money to some x where x is a person, then my lending that individual money is 
not explained merely by their being x but rather by their having the property of (say) being my friend. In that 
case it is the Fness of x which is explanatorily relevant, not just the stimulus being x. It is not the case that 
my lending money is explained merely by the debtor being a person. I lend money only to people who 
possess properties like ‘being a friend’. Moreover, the explanation requires that I recognise the individual as 
a friend to make sense of the fact that I do lend them money. In other words, I must represent this person as 
being a friend for the explanation to work because there is no nomic property of people which I respond to 
by lending them money.  
 Fodor’s insight allows us to see that representational explanations are needed only when there is no 
lawful connection between stimulus property and behaviour. Only representing the Fness of x (which cannot 
be accounted for by causal covariance because no natural law connects Fness to the behaviour) can explain 
this and this must be accounted for in mental representation. Contrast this picture with representational 
naturalism which — following the primacy of physics in Physicalism — just is seeking lawful connections 
between mental states and the things they are about. If we only require representations to explain selective 
response to non-nomic properties then it seems an intentional explanation of behaviour is ipso facto 
unrecoverable from a naturalistic starting point. 
 We are now in a position to define ‘representation as’: 
‘Representation as’: a representation user, Q, tokens a representation 𝕽(p) which represents x as F to 
Q by having content p = x is F. The Fness of x is essential to the causal-explanatory role of 𝕽(p), and 
F is a non-nomic property. 
‘Representation as’ serves to codify the fact that to ensure a representational explanation is needed Q must 
identify x as F in just the way Millikan and Dretske (1995) required. It is only through this that we can 
ensure that the Fness of x is essential to the explanation by building in that Q must recognise that x is F in 
 46
Michael Hegarty
order to use the representation in line with the JDC: in virtue of the fact that 𝕽(p) represents x as F. The 
problem is ensuring that x’s Fness is essential to causing Q’s behaviour. I argued that coextensive properties 
which are non-nomic in Fodor’s sense can’t be adequately differentiated between according to naturalistic 
approaches. Now I will suggest that there is no way to ensure this without introducing intentional terms like 
‘recognises that’ into my definition of representation, which was: 
(MR2): 𝕽(p) =Def  an internal state, 𝓢, that stands in for some object or state of affairs, 𝓞, (by having 
a content, p) such that 𝓢 is capable of causing behaviour in virtue of standing in for 𝓞. 
𝓢 is capable of causing behaviour in virtue of standing in for 𝓞 only if 𝓢 does stand in for 𝓞 by having the 
right content for the representational explanation, and if 𝓢 is used by (the representation user or system) Q in 
virtue of having that content. The difficulty is ensuring that Q does use 𝓢 in virtue of that content — passing 
the JDC. I argue one intuitive way to ensure this is ‘Representation as’. So, when 𝓞 is the state of affairs or 
object x which is F, 𝓢 must represent x as F and Q must recognise that 𝓢 represents x as F.  
 Clearly a definition of mental representation cannot mention ‘represents’ in the definiens on pain of 
circularity. Yet we need a way of building up that 𝓢 causes action by standing in for 𝓞 which ensures Q 
takes x to be F, or recognises that x is F. Is there a way to paraphrase this and still get across the sense of 
‘Representation as’? Candidates for replacement phrases might be: S ‘sees’, ‘knows’, ‘understands’, 
‘recognises’, ‘judges’, ‘thinks’, ‘identifies’, ‘believes’, ‘accepts’, or ‘grasps’ that x is F. However, a quick 
examination of these phrases shows that they are all intentional terms in Chisholm’s sense. It seems any way 
of rendering ‘Representation as’ will inevitably feature intentional terms. But this is not unexpected, and fits 
with Chisholm’s branch of the Chisholm-Quine Dilemma. Accepting this for now yields (MR3): 
(MR3): 𝕽(p) =Def  an internal state, 𝓢, of Q which (i) stands in for some object or state of affairs, 𝓞, 
which is that x is F; (ii) has the content p = ‘x is F’; (iii) causes Q’s behaviour because Q recognises 
that 𝓢 has the content ‘x is F’. 
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I have chosen ‘recognises that’ in (iii) to reflect ‘Representation as’, though other intentional locutions might 
do just as well. 
 My aim was to identify a deficiency of representations defined through representational naturalism 
and trace this to a common cause. I think the irreducible intentionality of ‘Representation as’ underlines this 
common cause. It is simply that the Chisholm-Quine Dilemma has not been successfully navigated. The 
fundamental incompatibility of naturalistic approaches and intuitions (PT1) and (PT2) has not been properly 
recognised. If I am correct, then intentionality is a Counterexample to Physicalism. Representational 
naturalism invites the Distinctively Mental Criticism because it fails to bear out our intuitions about the mind. 
A related criticism is that representational naturalism fails to yield determinate content or to convince that the 
content is essential for the explanation. A way to solve all these problems is available through something like 
‘Representation as’, but this is irreducibly intentional and thus leads to a Homunculus Regress under 
representational naturalism, hence the two are flatly incompatible. This exposes a difficult choice: either we 
reevaluate our intuitions in light of the success of our theories, or we should accept that accounting for 
intentionality leads to the equal plausibility of Physicalism and Property Dualism. To recap this point: 
intentionality cannot be explained satisfactorily under representational naturalism, suggesting Property 
Dualism is the correct ontology. However, this is not decisive because a proponent of Physicalism can 
respond — albeit weakly — that a complete future physics may be able to give a physical explanation for 
intentionality. However, my view is that, in the absence of a strong argument to believe future physics can do 
this we are more justified in holding Property Dualism. 
 One might object that intentional talk cannot be included in (MR3) because mental representations 
are subpersonal theoretical posits, as Ramsey and Morgan explicitly hold. Recognition and identification of 
the referent of a representation is an act on the personal level; there is no ‘seeing that’ or ‘taking that’ at the 
subpersonal level. As a first response, note that accounts like Indicator Semantics and Teleosemantics do not 
explicitly address the distinction. Moreover, discussions of mental representation in visual perception 
frequently blur the lines themselves by talking about ‘seeing’, ‘identifying’ and ‘taking’ objects to be this or 
that (Fodor, 1987: 197-108; Dretske, 1995: 30-32). Thus any analysis of mental representation involving the 
early and important work of Dretske and Millikan cannot avoid engaging in the same conceptual unclarity 
around personal/subpersonal which their work exhibits.  
 What all this means is unclear. I think it points to two orthogonal possible starting points on the 
mind. If we choose the picture that accepts (PT1) and (PT2) then I argue any naturalist account fails. This is 
because without ‘Representation as’ it does not pass the JDC, but with ‘Representation as’ it is engulfed by 
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the Homunculus Regress. If we choose the picture that denies (PT1) and (PT2) then a naturalist account can 
succeed but at the expense of determinate representational content and also failing to pass the JDC. On this 
interpretation of my results what is at issue is still what we mean by ‘representation’ in the first place. We 
cannot do justice to either (PT1) or (PT2) by thinking of representation as subpersonal because the account 
collapses as circular. But to do justice to them, it follows that representational naturalism must be denied and 
that representations must be personal-level posits.  
 If we need to invoke personal-level properties to get representations to do what their causal-
explanatory role requires — as has been my argument in proposing ‘Representation as’ — then it follows 
that representations cannot be subpersonal. ‘Representation as’ means applying personal-level properties to 
mental representations, i.e. entails that mental representations are at the personal level. To maintain, as 
Ramsey does, that representations are subpersonal then it is necessary to deny (PT1) and (PT2). If my 
reading of Ramsey’s JDC and my solution through ‘Representation as’ is right, it follows that no subpersonal 
theoretical posit actually could pass the JDC. The JDC itself is predicated on representations being the kind 
of phenomena which require personal-level notions like ‘Representation as’ to be able to have sufficiently 
determinate, causally efficacious content. 
 From here all that can be said is that the logical conclusion of representational naturalism of the kind 
Ramsey endorses is that the term ‘mental representation’ is not really ‘representational’ in the pre-theoretical 
sense at all. These theoretical posits may play valuable roles in subpersonal explanations of cognition, but 
they no longer bear significant resemblance to their pre-theoretical namesakes. 
4.4 Conclusion 
I have argued that naturalistic approaches to mental representation have so far failed to adequately account 
for the phenomena. They fail to meet Ramsey’s JDC because there is no reason to suppose a representation 
user uses the representation to cause behaviour in virtue of a particular representational content, in line with 
preserving the characteristics — aspectual shape, fine-grained individuation between coextensive properties 
— we ascribe to intentional contents. I proposed one solution to this problem of indeterminacy 
(‘Representation as’) which is irreducibly intentional. Thus, I argued, intentionality serves as a 
Counterexample to Physicalism. If we admit the intuitions underpinning our conception of intentionality 
have force then we have no decisive arguments in favour of either a physicalist or a property dualist 
metaphysics of mind. Moreover, I suggested that Ramsey’s JDC cannot be passed without invoking 
intentional terms and concepts when it comes to recognition of the referent of a representation. Therefore, 
representations must be at the personal level of explanation, and so any theory that treats them as 
 49
Michael Hegarty
subpersonal is unable to pass the JDC and fulfil the causal-explanatory role mental representations are taken 
to play. Consequently, if ‘Representation as’ remains the only way to pass the JDC, then representation is 
shown to be personal-level posit and subpersonal notions of representation — though possibly useful for 
explanation — should give up the claim to be significantly similar to everyday, non-mental representations. 
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